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AU/ACSC/0389/97-03
BUSH’S NEW WORLD ORDER:
THE MEANING BEHIND THE WORDS

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A Research Paper
Presented To
The Research Department

Air Command and Staff College
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements of ACSC
by
Maj. Bart R. Kessler

March 1997



Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do
not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of
Defense.


Contents
DISCLAIMER ................................................................................................................ii
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................v
WHAT “NEW WORLD ORDER?”.................................................................................1
New World Order Interpretations ................................................................................2
Methodology...............................................................................................................3
THE UNITED NATIONS’ FOUNDERS.........................................................................5
San Francisco Conference ...........................................................................................6
Council on Foreign Relations ......................................................................................9
Inquiry....................................................................................................................9
Foreign Policy Process Impact..............................................................................10
Foreign Affairs .....................................................................................................14
Foundations..........................................................................................................14
George Bush and New World Order Linkage ............................................................16
NEW WORLD ORDER VISION ..................................................................................19
War and Peace Studies ..............................................................................................19
World Order Models Project .....................................................................................23
1980s Project ............................................................................................................26
Visionary Conclusion ................................................................................................28
A CREDIBLE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS PEACEKEEPING ROLE .....................30
RULE OF LAW ............................................................................................................34
THE ROAD TO NEW WORLD ORDER......................................................................41
Third Try at New World Order..................................................................................42
New World Order Paths ............................................................................................44
United Nations Strengthening ...............................................................................44
Trilateral Regionalism...........................................................................................46
Piecemeal Functionalism.......................................................................................48
NEW WORLD ORDER IMPLICATIONS ....................................................................53
Multilevel Interdependence........................................................................................54
United Nations ..........................................................................................................55
Sovereignty ..........................................................................................................55
Peacekeeping........................................................................................................56
Common vs. National Interests .............................................................................59
Summary...................................................................................................................60
FINAL THOUGHTS .....................................................................................................63
BIBLIOGRAPHY .........................................................................................................65

AU/ACSC/0389/97-03

 Abstract
The phrase “new world order” has been widely used o n the political scene since first
publicly coined by former president, George Bush. Although quickly adopted as the catch
phrase of the 1990s, few people actually agree o n what “new world order” really means.
Since “new world order,” while elusive in definition, is most frequently used to describe
aspects o f the post Cold War international scenario, understanding the true meaning of
that phrase is critical to projecting our future strategic environment and prospects for the
new millennium. The attempt of this paper is to reveal that true meaning.
Historical analysis will be t he primary methodology used t o reveal the meaning of
George Bush’s specific terminology describing his concept o f “new world order.” In a
January 16, 1991 speech, he identified the opportunity to build a new world order “where
the rule of law…governs the conduct o f nations,” and “in which a credible United Nations
can use its peacekeeping ro le to fulfill t he promise and vision of t he UN’s founders.”
The se words will be dissect ed and historically analyzed to develop a clear picture of “new
world order.” Additionally, the primary mechanisms for implementing new world order
will be addressed; and finally, specific strategic environment and national security
implications will be drawn from those conclusions.

Chapter 1
What “New World Order?”
Out of these troubled times, our…objective—a new world order—can
emerge…Today, that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite
different from the one we have known…
 —Former President George Bush
September 11, 1990
The phrase, “new world order” has been widely used since first coined by George
Bush in his 1990 speech before a joint session of Congress. Although quickly adopted as
the catch phrase of the 1990s, few people actually agree o n what “new world order” really
means. It has been used to describe such diverse contemporary issues as the post Cold
War balance o f power, economic interdependence, fragmentation and the rise of
nationalism, and technology advancement and integration—basically any issue that
appears new and different. The general feeling is that while elusive, this “new world
order” is likely significant. Since “new world order” is most frequently used to describe
aspects o f the post Cold War international scenario, understanding the true meaning of
that phrase is critical to projecting our future strategic environment and prospects for the
new millennium. The attempt of this paper is to reveal that true meaning.
1

New World Order Interpretations
In relation to world politics, there are a few basic paradigm-driven interpretations of
the new world order. Joseph Nye, in his 1992 Foreign Affairs article, “What New World
Order?” identifies two of those: “Realists, in the tradition of Richard Nixon and Henry
Kissinger , see international politics occurring among sovereign states balancing each
others’ power. World order is the product of a stable distribution of power among the
major states. Liberals, in the tradition o f Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter, look at
relations among peoples as well as states. They see order arising fro m bro ad values like
democracy and human rights, as well a s from international law and institutions such as the
United Nations.”1
Another dichotomy of new world order interpretations is presented by Lawrence
Freedman in his Foreign Affairs article, “Order and Disorder in the New World.” The
“The first [interpretation] is that the slogan reflects a presumption that international
institutions and, in particular, the United Nations, will be taking a more active and
import ant role in global management …[T]he second interpretation…[is] that the phrase
‘new world order’ is merely descriptive, requiring no more than acceptance that the
current situation is unique and clearly different in critical respects” from the past.”2
The struggle to ascertain George Bush’s true meaning of new world order is not
unique to this author. Richard Falk, in his 1993 work, The Constitutional Foundations of
World Peace, struggled with the realist and liberalist—or more aptly termed—globalist
interpretations. “We could never be quite sure, especially in t he months of crisis leading up
to the war itself, whether George Bush was promising a new structure of international
relations based on respect for international law and on centrality for the United Nations, or
2


whether his use o f the phrase ‘a new world order’ was little more than a bid for public
support and an invitation that governments join the North in one further war in and against
the South.”3
So farther e are three new world order paradigms presented: realist based, focused on
balance of power; globalist based, focused on global management and the United Nations
(UN); and finally, idea list based, focused o n no thing more than the identification of
change. To make an accurate assessment of Bush’s precise meaning, more information is
obviously needed. On January 16, 1991, he further clarified his position in a speech
announcing t he hostilities wit h Iraq by identifying the opportunity to build a new world
order “where the rule of law…governs the conduct of nations,” and “in which a credible
United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the UN’s
founders.” (emphasis added)4 These specifics in describing Bush’s concept of new world
order clearly lean toward the globalist interpretation.

Methodology
Joseph Nye pointed out, that the “1991 Persian Gulf War was, according to President
Bush, about ‘more than one small country; it is a big idea; a new world order…”5 Bush’s
words, highlight ed in t he quote above, will be analyzed in detail t o reveal the nature of his
globalist “big idea” called new world order. Specifically, Chapter 2 will focus on the
identification of t he “UN’s founders.” Chapter 3 will attempt to frame their “vision.”
Chapter 4 will address a “credible Unite d Nations” and it s “peacekeeping role. ”Chapter 5
will analyze “the rule of law” in terms of governing “the conduct of nations.” Following
the detailed analysis of Bush’s words, the mechanisms for implementing the new world

3


order will be addressed in Chapter 6 as well as the implications of new world order in
Chapter 7. Chapter 8 will reflect this authors final thoughts on the subject.
Notes
1Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “What New World Order?” Foreign Affairs (Spring 1992), 84.
2Lawrence Freedman, “Order and Disorder in the New World,” Foreign Affairs
(1991/1992), 22.
3Richard A. Falk, Robert C. Johansen, and Samuel S. Kim, The Constitutional
Foundations of World Peace (Albany, N.Y. : State University of New York Press, 1993),
13.
 4George Bush, “Operation Desert Storm Launched,” Address to the Nation from the
White House, 16 January 1991. US Department of State Dispatch (21 January 1991), 38.
5Nye, 83.
4



Chapter 2
The United Nations’ Founders
Forty- five years ago, while the fires of an epic war still raged across two
oceans and two continents, a small group of men and women began a
search for hope amid the ruins. They gathered in San Francisco, stepping
back from the haze and horror, to try to shape a new structure that might
support an ancient dream.
 —George Bush
October 1, 1990

Interpreting Bush’s concept of new world order begins with identifying the “UN’s
founders. ” Who were these men and women “gathered in San Francisco?” Before
pursuing that question, though, it is interesting to note that Bush was not basing his “big
idea” on the founding fathers of this great nation, but on a less infamous group of UN
founders. In fact, our nation’s founding fathers may not have been enamored with the
who le concept of a United Nations. For instance, George Washington commented in his
farewell address that , “the great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in
extending our commercial relations, but to have with them as little political connection as
possible.”1
5



San Francisco Conference
The United Nations charter was established at the San Francisco Conference in June,
1945. By analyzing the events leading up to the conference and identifying some of the
key players, it may be possible to pinpoint Bush’s “UN founders.”
The War and Peace Studies of World War II provided the backdrop for the
development of the United Nations. After 1942, all study groups of the War and Peace
Studies shifted focus fro m the war effort t o developing the structure and responsibilities of
the future United Nations organization.2 In fact, “quite a few members o f the War and
Peace Studies groups, after leaving the program, participated in the preparatory
conference at Dumbarton Oaks or served in advisory positions at the organizing
conference of the United Nations in San Francisco in June 1945. So me of them actually
attained positions of considerable influence.”3
So exactly who were these people that transitioned from the War and Peace Studies
to the development and establishment o f the United Nations? On 12 September, 1939,
more than two years prior t o Unit ed States involvement in World War I I, Hamilton Fish
Armstrong (then editor of the Council on Foreign Relations publication, Foreign Affairs)
and Walter Mallory (then Executive Director of the Council) contacted the State
Department to offer the services of t he Council o n Foreign Relations. “The men of the
Council proposed a…program of independent analysis and study that would guide
American foreign policy in the coming years of war and the challenging new world that
would emerge after. The project became known as the War and Peace Studies.”4 Aware
of the fact that the State Department would not be able to create a brain trust within a
short period of time, both Secretary o f State Cordell Hull and Hull’s undersecretary,


6



Sumner Welles, agreed to the Council’s plan. 5 The State Department/ Council relationship
was not public knowledge, though. Isaiah Bowman, then a Council on Foreign Relations
Director, wrote in November of 1939 that, “the matter is strictly confidential, because the
whole plan would be ‘ditched’ if it became generally known that the State department is
working in collaboration with any outside group.”6
Over the next five years, almost 100 men, financed by nearly $350, 000 from the
Rockefeller Foundation, formulated 682 memoranda and drafts for the State Department.
The studies were divided into four primary functional groups: economic and financial,
security and armaments, territorial, and political—all headed and staffed by Council
members.7 Determining the precise impact of those memoranda on the decisions of the
State Department is impossible, but Armstrong and Mallory were convinced that their
efforts both defined the boundaries of debate within the government and secured the
Council’s role as the center of attention for setting foreign policy priorities.8
The cooperation between the Council and the State Department was further enhanced
when, in 1942, the State Department invited Council members to participate in the newly
created Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy. “This group…concentrated on
the United Nations organization, the successor to the League of Nations, a subject that
always received keen attention at Council meetings. ”9 In the spring o f 1943, Armstrong
and Norman H. Davis (a Council Director) proposed a plan to Secretary of State Hull for
a “supranat ional organization” base d on t he Wilsonian ideals of liberal internationalism.
Hull subsequently asked Davis to present the proposal to President Roosevelt.
Roosevelt liked the idea and within a short time blueprints for a charter of
the successor to the League o f Nations were drafted and discussed . . . In
his discussions with Davis, President Roosevelt proposed changes, and


7



Davis introduced these into the discussions and revisions of drafts.
Roosevelt, in August 1943, took the final draft with him to the Quebec
Conference, where it was accepted by Britain’s Prime Minister Winston
Churchill and Foreign Minister E den. With only minor changes, the text
was taken to Moscow and signed by delegates of the United States, Great
Britain, China, and the Soviet Union as the Moscow Declaration on 1
November 1943. In this document, the nations not only pledged to
co ordinate and co operate in their war aims but also declared ‘that they
recognized the necessity of establishing at the earliest predictable date a
general international organization, based on t he sovereign equality of all
peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and
small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.’10
The framework for the United Nations was clearly in place. The culmination would
come at the San Francisco Conference. Authors of the subject disagree as to the specific
amount of influence levied by the Council. Dan Smoot, in The Invisible Government,
concludes that: “The crowning moment of achievement for the Council came at San
Francisco in 1945, when over 40 members of the United States Delegation to the
organizational meeting of the United Nat ions…were members of the Council.”11 Cleon
Skousen in The Naked Capitalist deduced a different number when he said: “There were
74 CFR members in the American delegation to the UN Conference at San Francisco in
1945.…These…CFR members occupied nearly every significant decision-making spot in
the American delegation…”12 Whatever the number, it is clear that the Council was a
major player in both the conference and the founding of the UN. Even Michael Wala, who
is much less convinced o f the power of the Council than Smoot and Skousen, said in The
Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War that,
“only in the founding of the United Nations did their [Council] discussions about
organization and responsibilities have a direct and immediate impact.”13


8



Based the discussion so far, it seems reasonable to conclude that Bush’s “UN’s
founders, ” are represented, maybe not entirely, but at least in large part by the Council on
Foreign Relations. A more detailed look at the Council is required, t ho ugh, t o determine
their importance as related to a new world order.


Council on Foreign Relations
For the Council on Foreign Relations, as a “UN founder,” to play a significant role in
the creation o f Bush’s new world order, one would think that they must have some impact
on the formulation and/or implementation of American foreign policy. The relationship
between the Council and American foreign policy will now be further analyzed.

Inquiry
The internationalist ideal of the United Nations was not new. The Council members
viewed this as a “second chance” at internationalism through a supranational
organization.14 The first, the League of Nations, was a concept formulated with the help
of the “The Inquiry,” the predecessor to the War and Peace Studies and catalyst for the
creation of the Council on Foreign Relations. The Inquiry was a working “fellowship of
distinguished scholar s tasked to brief Woodrow Wilson about options for the postwar
world once the kaiser and imperial Germany fell to defeat.”15 In the few year s
immediately following the Paris Peace Conference, the leaders of the Inquiry established
the Council on Foreign Relations. “The vision that stirred the Inquiry became the work of
the Council on Foreign Relations over the better part of a century,” according to the
Council’s own 75 year history, Continuing The Inquiry.16

9



The Council was formally incorporated on July 29, 1921 with the specific purpose,
“to afford a continuous conference o n international questions affecting the United
States.”17 As supporters of Wilson and the League of Nations, Council members were
greatly disillusioned by the Senate ’s reject ion of t he League and the swell o f isolationist
sentiment in America. They “resolved to awaken America to its worldwide
responsibilities.” 18 Hence, began the Council’s long-standing drive to advocate globalist
foreign policies. T heir internationalist bent was clearly demonstrated by one of t he
Council’s first internal controversies. Within the first year or so of the Council’s
existence, an avowed isolationist was invited to speak at private Council dinner meeting.
Many members were outraged. “Russell C. Leffingwell, a partner of J.P. Morgan’s bank,
refused to stand at the lectern alongside an isolationist; Paul Warburg of Kuhn Loeb
vented outrage that an ‘uneducable demagogue’ should be offered Council hospitality.”19
In response, Isaiah Bowman, of the original Inquiry, presented a different perspective:
“What has Wall Street to gain by refusing to hear even a demagogue? Certainly if he is a
dangerous demagogue we ought all the more to hear him to discover why he is dangerous
and just how dangerous he is.”20 This episode established the precedent for Hamilton Fish
Armstrong’s strategy of presenting the Council as impartial by inviting varied speakers,
but limiting the membership t o t hose “influentia l figures who shared an internationalist
perspective.”21


Foreign Policy Process Impact
The Council on Foreign Relations has been singled out as one of the most influential
organizations impacting American foreign policy.22 The degree to which the Council has
influenced foreign policy over the last 75 years is heavily debated; the fact that it has is

10



not. The Council on Foreign Relations is populated with powerful figures from all walks
of life. Their own 25 year history stated that, “the Council’s membership has been unusual
in that it ha s included leaders of industry and finance, authorities on international law,
economics, and international relations, officers of the Foreign Service and of the armed
services of the United States in Washington and abroad, and prominent authors, editors
and newspapermen. Members have thus had direct access to the facts which affect foreign
policy.”23 Numerous United States presidents, secretaries of state, CIA directors, and
many other influential foreign policy positions have bee n filled with names fro m the rolls
of t he Council o n Foreign Relations. Just by scanning t he very short list of Council on
Foreign Relations past and present Directors and Officers, one can quickly identify several
key players in our recent administrations: George Bush, Cyrus Vance, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Warren Christopher, Brent Scowcroft,
Richard Cheney, William Cohen, William Crowe, Jr., Le s Aspin, Paul Volcker, and Alan
Greenspan.24 A review of the entire Council roll (which this author did not have the
resources to pursue) would produce many more.
The Council on Foreign Relations, because of wealthy, influential members such as
the Rockefellers, has been traditionally associated with the “elites” in America and has
been referred to by some as representative of the “Eastern Establishment. ” There are
many conspiracy theories associated with the Council’s influence o n American foreign
affairs. This paper is not intended to adopt any of those theories, but to show that
regardless o f support for these theories, most students of the Council have concluded that
there is substantial linkage between the Council and American foreign policy.


11



Michael Wala, who clearly denies support for the conspiracy view, still conclude s at
t he very end of his book, that , “t he Council o n Foreign Relations provided a well-
organized, yet informal, link between elites concerned with U.S. foreign relations and the
administration. At the same time it served as a connection between elite and public
opinion. The Council thus fulfilled a n important function in a corporatist strategy t o
devise the foreign policy of the United States.”25

Pro fessor G. William Domhoff has conclude d in his studies t ha t through the Council,
“the power elite formulates general guidelines for American foreign policy and provides
the personnel to carry out this policy.”26 As an example, he highlights that twelve of fifteen
presidential committees dealing wit h aspect s of foreign and military policy established
between 1945 and 1972 were headed by members of the Council on Foreign Relations.27
Anthony Lukas debunked the conspiracy theory in his article, but pointed out that,
“everyone knows how fraternity brothers can help other brothers climb the ladder of life.
If you want to make foreign policy, there’s no better fraternity to belong to than the
Council.”28
Carroll Quigley, a former Georgetown professor, who once taught President Clinton,
provided the most intriguing commentary on the subject. In his 1966 mammoth 1300 plus
page work, Tragedy and Hope—A History of the World in Our Time, Quigley commented
on the conspiracy theory: “This radical Right fairy tale, which is now an accepted folk
myth in many groups in America, pictured the recent history o f the United States…as a
well-organized plot by extreme Left- wing elements…to destroy the American way of
life .”29 He goes on to further clarify that, “this myth, like all fables, does in fact have a
modicum of truth. There does exist, and has existed for a generation, an international

12



Anglophile network…I know of the operations of this network because I have studied it
for twenty years and was permitted for two years, in the early 1960s, to examine its papers
and secret records. I have no aversion to it or to most of its aims and have, for much of
my life, been close to it and to many of its instrume nt s.”30 Quigley continues: “The two
ends of this English-speaking axis have sometimes been called, perhaps facetiously, the
English and American Establishments. There is, however, a considerable degree of truth
behind the joke, a truth which reflects a very real power structure. ”31 The linchpin is that
Quigley identifies t he “American Establishment ” ha lf o f the “Anglophile network” as t he
Council on Foreign Relations.32 These words probably provide the greatest testimony of
the power and influence of the Council on Foreign Relations because they come from a
man on the inside intimately familiar with the organization and it s linkage to the foreign
policy process.
Regardless o f their perspective, sever al students and one insider of the Council have
all concluded that the Council is a significant player in the American foreign policy
process. This author would have to agree despite the Council’s defense that it is nothing
more than, “a privately sponsored, privately financed, privately managed post- graduate
academy of political science, functioning in the true spirit of public service.”33 This picture
just doesn’t wash with the comments of members such as Richard Barnet who stated that,
“membership in t he Council on Foreign Relations…is a rite of passage for an aspiring
national security manager…The Council takes itself very seriously.”34
Given the Council’s role as a “UN founder” and their influence on foreign policy, two
more linkages need to be discussed prior to proceeding. The first is the role o f the

13



Council publication, Foreign Affairs, and the second is the relationship between the
Council and tax exempt foundations.


Foreign Affairs
Pa rt of t he Council on Foreign Relation’s purpose is t o provide a foreign affairs
educational forum. One of their primary tools to achieve that purpose is their publication,
Foreign Affairs. Officially, Foreign Affairs does no t represent the views o f the Council,
but those of individuals, and is open t o all perspectives. However, Wala and Schulzinger
have slightly different interpretations. Wala points out that through discussion groups and
Foreign Affairs, Council members sought to “build a consensus, not of the broad public,
but of the elites of finance and business, of academicians at prestigious universities, and of
‘responsible’ officials in the State Department. This was to serve as the basis and
legitimization of foreign policy decisions. When results o f the discussion at the at the
Council were considered important and relevant , t he y could be published in Foreign
Affairs.”35 Schulzinger, in The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs adds that, “while the editors
saw themselves as the models of impartiality, no reader could be fooled into thinking that
the journal was anything other than a plea for forward United States foreign policy.”36
Since articles published in Foreign Affairs primarily represent t he  ideologies and policies
import ant to the Council, t hey will be frequently utilized as primary source s later in this
paper.


Foundations
It is important to note that the Council on Foreign Relations is not a stand-alone
entity with a monopoly o n foreign policy influence. No one organization can be all-


14



powerful in today’s complex society. There are many influential organizations, but the
Council is one of the few that has been consistently identified throughout the last 75 years.
One additional linkage important to highlight for the rest o f this analysis, though, is that of
tax exempt foundations.
Republican Congressman Carroll Reese, heading a Special Committee o n Tax-
Exempt Foundations, concluded the following in his final report published December 16,
1954 by the Government Printing Office:
Miss Casey’s report (Hearings pp.8777, et seq.) shows clearly the interlock
between The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and some of
its associated o rganizations, such as the Council on Foreign Relations and
other foundations, with the State Department…They have undertaken vital
research projects for the Department; virtually created minor departments
or groups within the Department for it; supplied advisors and executives
from their ranks; fed a constant stream of personnel into the State
Department trained by themselves o r under programs which they have
financed; and have had much to do with the formulation of foreign policy
both in principle and detail.…They have, to a marked degree, acted as
direct agents of the State Department.…What we see here is a number of
large foundations, primarily The Rockefeller Foundation, The Carnegie
Corporation of New York, and the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, using their enormous public funds to finance a one-sided approach
to foreign policy and to promote it actively, among the public by
propaganda, and in the Government through infiltration. The power to do
this comes out of the power of the vast funds employed.37
Nearly twenty years later, Professor Domhoff further evidenced the linkage by
pointing out that “in 1971, 14 of 19 Rockefeller Foundation trustees were members of the
Council on Foreign Relations, with 4 of those members also serving as direct ors of t he
council. Ten of 17 trustees of the Carnegie Corporation, as the most important of four
Carnegie foundations is named, were members of the council at that time, as were 7 of 16
trustees at the Ford Foundation.”38 The foundations have provided a funding source for
many activities of t he Council and related organizations. Recall t he earlier mentioned

15



financier of the War and Peace Studies—the Rockefeller Foundation. The foundation
linkage will reappear in later discussions on the “vision” of the “UN founders.”


George Bush and New World Order Linkage
Two final questions need to be addressed prior to proceeding. The first is, could
George Bush have actually inferred involvement of an organization like the Council on
Foreign Relations in his “UN founders” phrase? Given Bush’s long-standing involvement
with the organization, it seems reasonable to conclude that the answer is, yes! Bush was
on the Council Board o f Directors in the years 1977-1979 and a member long before
that.39 He stepped down from the boards of the Council, Yale, and the Trilateral
Commission to she d his “establishment ” image prior to his run for t he Republican
presidential nomination.40 But, despite early momentum, he lost the 1980 Republican
primary to Ronald Reagan due largely to what Holly Sklar calls, “right wing opposition to
his…association with the Eastern Establishment.”41 Obviously, Bush knows a thing or two
about the workings o f the Council and as such, clearly understands their linkage to the
formation of the United Nations.
The second question is, why has such a significant amount of effort gone into
describing the relationships of the Council on Foreign Relations prior to proceeding with
the analysis o f Bush’s new world order words? Understanding t he Council relationship is
critical to establishing the framework for the upcoming description of new world order
vision and implement at ion mechanisms. Council related writings will therefore provide the
predominant sources for the rest of this paper.

16


Notes
1Gary Allen, Say “No!” to the New World Order (Seal Beach, Calif: Concord Press,
1987), 13.
2Michael Wala, The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in
the Early Cold War (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn Books, 1994), 42.
3Ibid., 44.
4Peter Grose, Continuing the Inquiry: The Council on Foreign Relations From 1921
to 1996 (New York, N.Y.: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), 23.
5Wala, 31.
6Ibid.
7Grose, 23.
8Robert D. Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.:
Columbia University Press, 1984), 79.
9Wala, 34.
10Ibid., 35.
11Dan Smoot, The Invisible Government (Dallas, Tex.: The Dan Smoot Report,
1962), 5.
12Cleo n W. Skousen, The Naked Capitalist. Salt Lake City, Utah: Reviewer, 1970),
52.
 13Wala, 42.
14Ibid., 43.
15Grose, 1.
16Ibid.
17John W. Davis, The Council on Foreign Relations, 1921-1946 (New York, N.Y.:
Council on Foreign Relations, 1947), 7.
18Anthony J. Lukas, “The Council on Foreign Relations--Is It a Club? Seminar?
‘Invisible Government’?”  The New York Times Magazine (21 November 1971), 124.
19Grose, 15.
20Ibid.
21Schulzinger, 18.
22Wala, ix.
23Davis, p11
24Grose, 69-72.
25Wala, 243.
26Lukas, 124.
27William G. Domhoff, Who Rules America Now? (New York, N.Y.: Simo n &
Schuster, Inc., 1983), 133.
28Lukas, 125.
29Carroll Quigley, Tragedy and Hope-A History of the World in Our Time (New
York, N.Y.: MacMillan Company, 1966), 949.
30Quigley, 950.
31Ibid., 956.
32Ibid., 952.
33Schulzinger, 246.

17



Notes
34Ibid., 248.
35Wala, 12.
36Schulzinger, 11.
37Smoot, 163.
38Domhoff, 93.
39Grose, 70.
40Schulzinger, 239.
41Holly Sklar, ed. Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for
World Management (Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1980), 573.


18



Chapter 3
New World Order Vision


In a quite literal sense, world order visions can, like religion, act as
opiates…It is necessary to practice, as well as preach, global reform, and
to embody world order values in present public policy choices.
—Richard A. Falk
World Order Models Project
The current task at hand is to build a clear picture of the new world order “promise
and vision” of Bush’s UN founders. To accomplish this, the ideas that evolved from the
War and Peace studies will first be examined. Then two, more contemporary world order
studies related to the Council on Foreign Relations will be evaluated. The aspects of new
world order vision that impact national security strategy are those that will be highlighted.

War and Peace Studies
In his 1992 Foreign Affairs article, Joseph Nye, comparing the present with the past,
concluded that “when the decline o f Soviet power led to Moscow’s new policy of
co operation with Washington in applying the UN doctrine of collective security against
Baghdad, it was less the arrival of a new world order than the reappearance of an aspect
of the liberal institutional order that was supposed to have come into effect in 1945.”1


19



And the vision of t hat liberal institutional order was driven by the Council’s War and
Peace Studies.
The first critical challenge to world order vision was to resolve the competing nature
of universal order on one hand and national sovereignty on the other. Walter R. Sharp, a
general working o n the War and Peace Studies Politics group, denounced the “popular
fetishism of sovereignty” and advocated the creation of “an international society which
will be physically secure, economically stable, and culturally free .”2 Sharp foresaw the
advancement of economic interdependence as means of eroding national barriers.
On the security side, the studies concluded that the new United Nations must have
responsibility for policing international disorders. Several recommendations were
presented for the creation of an international police-like force. Rather than creating a true
multinational army, Colonel George Fielding Eliot advocated assigning whole units of
national forces o n a two-year rotating basis to UN command. Eliot’s fear of a permanent
UN multinational police force was that a centralized Chief of Staff, “devoid of nationality
and t he restraints of loyalty and his own country’s laws, might well seek to carve out a
Napoleonic future of his own.”3
Another Armaments group staffer, Theodore P. Wright, presented a truly visionary
strategy for international policing which ma y be viewed as a prophesy of the outcome of
the Gulf War . Wright foresaw air power as the wise solution to overcoming the
difficulties of forging a true international army. Air power provided the opportunity for
awesome destructiveness while employing relatively few personnel. Wright explains: “The
war has…taught us the lesson that now, with the advent of air power, the small state is
indefensible, a position analogous to that of the feudal castle with the advent of gun-


20




powder.” Minor powers lacked air forces of any significance and were helpless against
superpower fighters and bombers acting under UN direction. He expected an international
air force to apply “quick and certain” retribution against peace violators. Such action,
according to Wright would promote the “development of feelings of world citizenship.”4
The Gulf Wa r could be vie we d as fulfillment of that vision. Asymmetrical coalition
air forces under UN authority ( via resolution) provided the “quick and certain” retribution
against the violator, Iraq. In fact, George Bush alluded to the “development of feelings of
world citizenship” when he hoped that out o f the “horror of combat,” Iraq would
recognize that “no nation can stand against a united world” and bring itself to “rejoin the
family of peace-loving nations.”5
Grayson Kirk, also of the Armament group, envisioned the necessity of an
“intermediate arrangement” between the jump from world war to world sovereignty. He
advocated an intermediate step of regional security arrangements built around the United
States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and China. Additionally, he felt that regionalism
could only be a catalyst for international integration if it remained informal and flexible.6
The Council strongly backed the loosening of the definition of American interests to
include applying military force “wherever a serious threat to peace may arise.” Aggressor
nations must be thwarted by collective force. As such, a criteria for determining
aggression must be established. The Armaments group identified an aggressor as a
“nat ion which has 1) committed specified, overt military a cts; 2) steadfastly refused to
submit their dispute to an inter national agency; and 3) refused to comply with the
decisions of these agencies.”7


21



The War and Peace Studies therefore formulated a foundational vision of a new world
order of transitional sovereignty, aided by economic interdependence; collective security
maintaining international order through a multinational police force under centralized
authority; and, a shift from unilateral actions based solely on national interests to support
of collective actions based on common interests, especially against “aggressor nations.”
The authors of the War and Peace Studies provided both the framework of the new
world order vision and the realization that the international transformation would be a
long term venture. Unlike their Paris Peace Conference predecessors, the studies staffers
recognized that shift to greater world sovereignty would take time and that the “United
States would have to participate in years o f conferences to create the new world order.”8
In addition, regional arrangements would provide the stepping stone to world order.
Since this evolution—as predicted—has been a long term venture, it pays to look at
some more recent Council related studies to provide more fidelity to the contemporary
new world order vision.
In the 1970s, two independent studies related to new world order were undertaken.
One, the World Order Models Project, was directed by Council member and former
Rutgers Professor of Law, Saul H. Mendlovitz, with heavy academic contributions by
another Council member, Princeton Professor Richard A. Falk, and financed by the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Rockefeller Foundation.9 The
second, The 1980s Project, was an extensive study produced by the Trilateral
Commission, a Council offshoot created by David Rockefeller to focus on developing
trilateral regional cooperation between the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.


22



World Order Models Project
Richard Falk and other World Order Models Project (WOMP) contributors give
credit to Mendlovitz as having “done much to shape the course of this world order
journey” over the past 25 year s.10 The WOMP provides probably the most idealistic vision
for the new world order, concentrating on evolving a “transnational framework of world
order values, thinking, and action.” 11 The four central world order values are: “(1) The
minimization of large- scale collective violence; (2) the maximization of social and
economic well-being; (3) the realization of fundamental human rights and conditions of
political justice; (4) the rehabilitation and maintenance of environmental quality, including
the conservation of resources.”12 It is interesting to note that Robert S. McNamara was a
member of the WOMP Sponsoring and Policy Review Committee.13
The WOMP, while idealistic, was surely not utopian. Mendlovitzde scribes the
action-oriented WOMP methodology: “In fact, each author was asked to attempt a
diagnosis of the contemporary world order system, make prognostic statements based on
that diagnosis, state his preferred future world order and advance coherent and viable
strategies of transition that could bring that future into being. A stringent time frame [for
implementation], the 1990s, served to discipline and focus thought and proposals.…There
was also general agreement that we should go beyond the nation-state system…to use a
much broader range of potential actors, including world institutions, transnational actors,
international organization, functional activities, regional arrangements, the nation- state,
subnational movements, local communities, and individuals.” 14
While the WOMP values seem mundane enough, their conclusions were not. With
the main concern o f the WOMP being war and its destructive nature, one of their central


23




new world or dervisio ns in Falk’s A Study of Future Worlds was t he “dismantling [of] t he
national security apparatus in the major states of the world.”15 Hidemi Suganami, in his
review of world order proposals, summarizes Falk’s new world order guiding principles as
world disarmament, establishment of an international police force to settle disputes,
implementation of a global checks and balances system, and constitution of a coordinating
body to provide unity to the global structure.16
WOMP-related work has continued throughout the years. Mendlovitz more recently
developed specific time phased objectives to support what he called a “Movement For A
Just World Peace.” His short run objectives for 1991-1993 included “initiating an annual
process of five percent reductions in defense budgets over a ten- year period with savings
being allocated for basic needs, domestically and globally.” His intermediate targets for
2001-2003 included: the “establishment of a small but permanent peacekeeping force for
the UN with the authority of humanitarian intervention in civil wars,” the “submission to
the compulsory jurisdiction o f the International Court of Justice for all treaties concluded
during and after the decade of 1990,” and the “establishment of a court to deal with
individuals who commit crimes against humanity.”  And finally, Mendlovitz’s long range
goals for 2011-2013 were much more ambitious. They included, a “global tax scheme to
establish and maintain a basic needs regime for global society,” a “complete and general
disarmament with alternative security system in place,” and a “regional and global human
rights regime with compulsory jurisdiction.”17
Mendlovitz presents a vision of evolutionary disarmament accompanied by
corresponding strengthening of a UN security apparatus. Additionally, he advocates a
mechanism—global tax—to fund inter national organizations and foresees an enhancement


24




of international judiciary powers. This vision at first blush may seem somewhat radical,
but a closer look shows it not to be far off the mark. The process of disarmament, spurred
by the end of the Cold War, did in fact begin about the time Mendlovitz predicted. The
UN security apparatus has strengthened through the course of recent activities in Bosnia,
Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda. The United States seems to have fully adopted the concept
of UN sponsored and supported actions based on the extent of UN/multinational related
doctrine being published by the Department of Defense. Several recommendations for a
tax on international flights to financially support the UN have recently been presented, the
most notable by former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. 18 And finally, the
enhancement of international judiciary powers is demonstrated by such recent events as
the 1996 swearing-in of 21 judges constituting the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea.19
The reason for success in implementing world order visions is not chance. These
visionaries do not perceive their actions as academic exercises. They do not advocate
passive acceptance of evolutionary world order shifts, but active engineering of the
transition process. Falk clearly states that “transition tactics and strategy involve
accelerating the process and devising ways to assure its completion in accordance with our
specified value preferences. In this sense, it adopts an activist or engineering
posture…”20 Later, in A Study of Future Worlds, Falk provides a specific strategy:
“Symbolic world leaders such as the Secretary General of the United Nations or the Pope
might espouse [the WOMP agenda]…as a program for the future, and national leaders in
prosperous, homogenous, and stable countries of intermediate size such as Sweden or
Canada may also be led to lend open support. These kinds of external developments,


25



together with much more vital citizen efforts within the United States, would initiate a
world order dialectic within American politics that would begin to break down decades of
adherence to [the Westphalian system] and its infrastructure of values, perceptions, and
institutions.” 21 The articulated philosophies of former Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali and the active advocacy of UN peacekeeping by Canada, may be evidence
of reasonable success of Falk’s twenty year old strategy.

1980s Project
There is one additional new world order project which needs to be addressed prior to
proceeding. In the 1970s, the Council on Foreign Relations, primarily through its
offshoot --t he Trilateral Commission, under took a five year, $1.6 million research effort
titled the “1980s Project.” According to its Director, Richard H. Ullman, the 1980s
Project was “the largest single research and studies effort the Council on Foreign
Relations has undertaken in its…history, comparable” only to the War and Peace Studies
of World War II.22 The 1980s Project’s task was to define the issues and policies required
to respond to a post Cold War international scenario. Unlike its predecessors, the Inquiry
and the War and Peace Studies, the 1980s Project was a study effort open to members and
non-members, and openly published to stimulate a broad professional audience--not just
government decision-makers.23
The primary focus of the 1980s Project was social and economic issues, but a few
security related studies were pursued. In fact, Cyrus Vance, former Council director,
chaired a group charged with studying weapons of mass destruct ion immediately prior t o
becoming Secretary of State.24


26




One clear influence on our current military came from t he study titled International
Disaster Relief (1977). It recommended that Washington should do more to coordinate
it s relief effort s to assist flood, earthquake , famine , and other disaster victims. Relief
agencies should be given more direct responsibility for o perations. And, all nations should
accept the “common responsibility of all people and governments to provide protection
and relief to the victims of natural disasters.”25 This concept has manifest itself this decade
in the likes of So malia and Rwanda. The United States has adopted humanitarian
assistance as a military mission and corresponding military doctrine is currently on the
street and being written to more effectively involve the relief agencies in humanitarian
assistance operations.
The 1980s Project, under the auspices of the Trilateral Commission, primarily
involved authors from the United States, Europe, and Japan. The broadly based
recommendations ignored the centrality of the Cold War and as a whole indicted the
“narro w, ethnocentric, and ideological course of American foreign policy since 1945.26
The diverse set of policy recommendations, clearly globalist in nature, advocated an
incremental approach to functional interdependence. The project ideas, while seemingly
ahead of their time, set the agenda for the next couple of decades. The Carter
administration attempted to implement so me of the 1980s Project “world order politics”
in 1977 and 1978, but fell victim to the reality of the Cold War.27
The Council, in its own historical account, again highlights its ability t o influence the
implementation o f its own world order ideas: “As it turned out, the title of the project was
a little premature; no t until the 1990s did the issues explored truly dominate the
international agenda. But many 1980s Project authors were by then installed in


27



government policy-making positions, and when the Cold War came to its unexpectedly
sudden end the Council had provided for the public record an impressive database for the
global issues confronting coming generations.”28


Visionary Conclusion
By analyzing the above studies, the “visio n of the UN founders” comes into a little
better focus. The vision is clearly globalist. It advocates a shift in sovereignty from the
state to the international level; increased authority, security, and judicial powers of an
international body; a focus on “common” interests of humanity; collective vs. unilateral
security actions; enhanced social and economic inter dependence through functionalism;
and some significant level of military disarmament of the nation states. This new world
order vision provides the framework for interpreting a “credible United Nations” and its
“peacekeeping role” in the upcoming chapter.

Notes
1Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “What New World Order?” Foreign Affairs (Spring 1992), 90.
2Robert D. Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.:
Columbia University Press, 1984), 85.
3Ibid., 88.
4Ibid., 90.
5George Bush, “Operation Desert Storm Launched,” Address to the Nation from the
White House, 16 January 1991. US Department of State Dispatch (21 January 1991), 38.
6Schulzinger, 90-91.
7Ibid., 92-93.
8Ibid., 108.
9Richard A. Falk, A Study of Future Worlds (New York, N.Y.: Free Press, 1975),
xxvii.
10Richar d A. Falk, Robert C. Johansen, and Samuel S. Kim. The Constitutional


Foundations of World Peace (Albany, N.Y. : State University of New York Pr ess, 1993),
3.


 11Falk, Johansen, and Kim, 3.


12Falk, 11.


28





Notes


13Ibid., xxxi.


14Ibid., xxii-xxiii.


15Ibid., 17.


16Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge,


Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 149.


17Richard A. Falk, Samuel S. Kim, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., The United Nations


and a Just World Order. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 567-568.


18Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Groping for a New World Order.” U.S. News & World


Report, (28 September 1992), 52.


19Boutros Bo utro s-Ghali, United Nations Press Release SG/SM/6089 SEA/1534 18


October 1996 (On-line. Internet, 25 March 1997. Available from http://www.un.org), 1.


20Falk, 280.


21Ibid., 419.


22Schulzinger, 225.


23Peter Grose, Continuing the Inquiry: The Council on Foreign Relations From 1921


to 1996 (New York, N.Y.: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), 61.


24Schulzinger, 231.


25Ibid., 234.


26Ibid.


27Ibid., 236.


28Grose, 62.


29





Chapter 4


A Credible United Nations and its Peacekeeping Role


The founding of the United Nations embodied our deepest hopes for a
peaceful world.


 —George Bush


October 1, 1990


To be “credible, ” the United Nations is dependent upo n the full development o f its


“peacekeeping role” as envisio ned by its founders. As a seco nd attempt to implement


Wilso nia n-like int ernat ionalism, t he United Natio ns must ac hie ve inte rnatio na l cre dibilit y


to shed the stigma of its aborted predecessor, the League o f Nations. The


inte rdependence be tween cre dibilit y and peacekeeping is most clearly articulated by


former Secretary-General Boutr os Boutros-Ghali: “Under Article 42 of the Char ter, the


Securit y Council ha s t he a uthorit y t o ta ke milit ary act ion to ma int ain or resto re


international peace and security. While such action should only be taken when all peaceful


means have failed, the opt ion of taking it is essent ia l t o the credibility o f the United


Nations as guarantor of international security.” (emphasis added)1 So, c redibilit y o f t he


UN as a guarantor of international security is contingent upo n having both the authority


and means to take military action.


In understanding the UN’s peacekeeping role, it is impo rtant to note the semantic


difference between war and peacekeeping fr om the UN founders’ perspective.


30


Peacekeeping is a mor e contempo rary word for what the UN fo unders envisioned as


international police action. Payso n Wild o f the War and Peace Studies Armaments group


distinguished between war and international policing (o r peacekeeping in to day’s


vernacular) by defining police actio n as force used “in behalf of the community” for “the


maintenance of order and the establishment of the supremacy of law” versus war which is


“co nducted for a national author ity” to achieve “the defeat o f the enemy.” Policing or


peacekeeping implied that armed forces are “under community contro l and used only


against tho se who break community laws.”2 The supremacy o f law in this context relates


to Bush’s “rule of law” which will be covered in the next chapter.


Roosevelt himself used the po lice analogy in describing credible UN peacekeeping:


“The Council of the United Natio ns must have the power to act quickly and decisively to


keep the peace by fo rce, if necessary.”3 In discounting the extreme leverage applied by


Security Council members such as the United States, Ro osevelt continued his analogy: “A


policeman would not be a very effective policeman if, when he saw a felon break into a


house, he had to go to the Town Hall and call a town meeting to issue a warrant before


the felon co uld be arrested.”4 Again, it is clear that the UN must possess both the


authority and means to be an effective and credible international “policeman.”


The autho rity comes through reduction in the ro le o f the Security Council veto . The


“means” mo st generally advocated is that of a permanent UN peacekeeping force. Robert


C. Johansen in the WOMP related work, The Constitutional Foundations of World Peace


explains: “To give a substantial boost to its capacities for war prevention, the United


Natio ns needs a permanent peacekeeping for ce o f its own. A permanent force co uld be


immediat ely available; it would be less subje ct t o c ha rges of bias than ad hoc pe rsonnel


31





now drawn from the national armed forces of UN members; it could be mor e effectively


trained, organized, and better commanded, equipped with specialized units, and


judiciously emplo yed to car ry o ut the unusually delicate tasks o f peacekeeping, which


seldom resemble conventio na l milit ary ac tion.…T he proposed UN fo rce c ould help


stimulate the transitio n to a warless world because it would r emind nations of the


differe nc e bet ween po lic e e nforce ment and militar y act ion.”5 He then paints a very quaint


picture of international police enforcement: “Armies try to achieve victor y; police seek


t ranquilit y. Police t ry to enforce la w on individuals, whe reas armies impose t he ir will on


entire societies. Altho ugh UN peacekeepers so metimes carry arms, these soldiers have no


enemies.”6


Boutro s Boutros-Ghali, also a per manent force advo cate, recommended that


negotiations co mmence to create the “special agreements fo reseen in Article 43 o f the


Chart er, whereby Me mbe r St at es undert ake to make armed for ces, assist ance and fa cilitie s


available to the Security Co uncil for the purposes stated in Article 42, not only o n an ad


hoc basis but on a permanent basis.” (emphasis added)7 He felt that the end of the Cold


War r emoved t he major polit ical obsta cles preventing ea rlie r fulfillme nt of t his Chart er


vision.


Burns H. Weston, another Constitutional Foundations of World Peace author,


provides the mo st comprehensive strategy for achieving “cr edible” UN peacekeeping. He


suggests: (1) guaranteeing milita ry unit s t rained fo r peacekeeping to the UN on a


perma ne nt st andby ba sis; (2) st ockpiling milit ary e quipme nt and supplies to support short


notice peacekeeping operations; (3) avoiding the obstructions posed by the Security


Council veto by instituting automatic peacekeeping actions based o n predetermined levels


32





of crisis or thresholds o f conflict and automatic financing arrangements; ( 4) ensuring


access to ar eas o f co nflict without requiring initial or co ntinuing permission of the


co nflicting parties; and (5) tying UN peacekeeping to peacemaking to ensur e focus on the


desired end-state of long-term stability in the troubled area.8


In summary, fur ther clar ification of Geor ge Bush’s words identifies a new world


orde r whe re a “cr edible Unit ed Na tions” achieves aut horit y by minimizing t he ro le of


Security Council veto and uses per manently assigned/allocated armed for ces in a


“peacekeeping role” to fulfill the international policeman “vision of the UN’s founders.”


Notes


1Bo utro s Bo utros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace-- Preventive Diplomacy,


Peacemaking, and Peace- keeping” Report of the Secretary-General, 17 June 1992 ((On-
line.Internet, 25 March 1997. Available from http://www.un. org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html.),
9.


 2Ro bert D. Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.:


Columbia University Press, 1984), 93.


3Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge,


Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 121.


4Ibid.


5Richard A. Falk, Ro bert C. Johansen, and Samuel S. Kim. The Constitutional


Foundations of World Peace (Albany, N.Y. : State University of New York Pr ess, 1993),
46-47.


6Falk, Johansen, and Kim, 47.


7Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace”, 9.


8Falk, Johansen, and Kim, 362.


33





Chapter 5


Rule of Law


America and the world must support the rule of law. And we will.


—Former President George Bush


September 11, 1990 Address before Congress


Our ideal is a world community of States which are based on the rule of
law and which subordinate their foreign policy activities to law.


—Mikhail Gorbachev


December 7, 1987 Address to the UN General Assembly


Critical to the interpretation of Bush’s call for a new world order “where the rule of


law . . . go verns the co nduct of nations,” is the understanding o f the context o f “rule of


law.” It is int ere st ing that while using t he same “rule o f la w” phrase in t heir a ddresses,


Bush failed to provide a ny c larific atio n of meaning, yet Gorbachev explic itly highlight ed


that states “subordinate their foreign policy activities to law.”1


Former Secretary o f State James Baker pro vided some “rule of law” clar ification on


September 26, 1990 when he advised the House Fo reign Affairs Committee that, “we


must ac t so t hat int ernat ional la ws, not inte rnatio na l out la ws, go ve rn the post-Cold War


period. We must act so that right, not might, dictates success in the post-Cold War


world.…We must stand with the world so that the United Nations does not go the way o f


the League of Nations.”2


34





Henry Kissinger additionally po inted out that “co nventional American thinking”


suppo rts the notio n o f “a new wo rld order,” emerging from a “set of legal arrangements.”3


It is impo rtant to note the linkage created between new world o rder, r ule of law--


international law, and the United Nations. Just ho w would these new world order “legal


arra ngements” of int ernat io na l law be implement ed a nd what is the relat ionship t o t he


United Nations?


Jame s Ba ker once again provided some insight . Responding to Ho use Fore ign Affairs


Committee questioning, Baker said that we, the United States, “are par ty to the United


Nat io ns’ char ter by virt ue of a tr eat y, a tre aty that basically says we will respect t he


decisions of that bo dy.”4 Author Laura L. Kirmse, after researching the details of Baker’s


premise, has concluded that Bush’s new world order refers to a move toward world


authority under the auspices of a revitalized United Natio ns, and that UN treaties, once


ratified by the Senate, may override and supersede the laws of the US, and even the


Constitution itself.5


The Constitution of the United States directs the following in regard to treaties:


(Article II, Sectio n 2) He (the President) shall have the power by and with
the advice and co nsent of the Senate to make treaties, provided two thir ds
of the Senators present concur…


(Article VI) This Co nstitutio n, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereo f; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the autho rity of the United States, shall be the supreme law of
the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in
the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary not withstanding.6


(emphasis added)


In the Jefferso nian tradition, tr eaties wer e intended to affect state-to- state actions, not


to have direct authority within a countr y over the laws, regulations, or the relationship


between the gover nment and its citizens. Several legal decisio ns and constitutional


35





interpretations have demonstrated otherwise, though. Kirmse identifies several legal


rulings which support the supremacy of the UN Charter. Fuji v. the State of California


provides the most eye-opening position:


The Charter of the United Nations, as a treaty, is paramount to every law
of every state in co nflict with it. The Charter of the United Nations, upon
ratificatio n o f the Senate, became supreme law of the land, within
Constitutional pro vision relating to treaties, and every state is requir ed to
accept and act upo n the Charter according to its plain language, and its
unmistakable purpose and intent. United Nations Charter. 59 Stat.1035 et
seq.; U.S. Const. art. 6. (Fuji v. State of California, 217P.2d. rehearing
denied).7


John Foster Dulles understo od this concept well as attested by these comments made


in a 1952 speech [documented in the Congressional Record] o f his prior to being


appointed Secretary of State: “The treaty-making power is an extr aordinary power liable


t o abuse. T reat ies ma ke inte rna tiona l la w a nd a lso they make do me st ic law. Under our


Constitution, treaties beco me the supreme law of the land. They are indeed more supr eme


than or dinary laws, for congressio nal laws are invalid if they do not confo rm to the


Constitution, wher eas treaty laws can override the Constitution. Treaties, for example,


can take powers away from the Congress and give them to the Federal Government or to


some international body and they can cut acro ss the rights given the people by the


Constitutional Bill of Rights.”8


Several wise Americans in the 1950s began to fear bo th the legal power o f United


Nations-related treaties to supersede the Constitution and the vague authority of the


President through the “conduct of foreign affairs” to bind the United States legally by


executive agreements requiring no Senate r atification. The deals at Yalta between


President Roosevelt and Stalin, the Potsdam agr eement between President Truman and


36





Stalin, and according to then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, o ver 10,000 NATO


agreements all fall within the context of “executive agreements.” Many were never


published. As a r esult, Senator Jo hn W. Bricker, supported by 63 other Senators,


sponsor ed an amendment to clo se the perceived Constitutional loopholes. The Bricker


Amendment would have added the following language to clarify the Constitution:


A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Constitution shall not be of
any force or effect.


A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only
through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty.


Congress shall have po wer to regulate all executive and other agreements
with any fo reign power or international organization. All such agreements
shall be subject to the limitations imposed on treaties by this article.9


Alt ho ugh seemingly pat riot ic a nd simple , the amendment was kille d by Preside nt


Eisenhower.10 Not to infer cause and effect, but only to note the curious—Dwight D.


Eisenhower was a member of t he Council on Fo reign Relat ions.11 The fears that United


States citizens may be legally subject to trials of international courts were not suppressed.


The House Foreign Affairs Committee discussio n with Secretary of State Baker in


September of 1990 reveals that this concern is not antiquated:


Sen. Mo ynihan: Do es the President have a constitutional right to violate
international treaties?


Secretary Baker: No.


Sen. Moynihan: A treaty is the supreme law of the land?


Secretary Baker: That’s right.12


The evidence o f constitutional lo gic, legal precedence, and executive and legislative


intent seems to suppo rt Kirmse’s conclusion that: “By the signing of the treaty to join the


United Nations in 1942 and by the signing of the revised Charter in 1945—which are bo th


37





multilateral treaties and constituent agreements—both the Constitution and the


sovereignty of the United States were in effect relinquished under an established precedent


in favor o f rule by the United Nations, its Charter , and all subsequent treaties formulated


and signe d under UN a uspice s. Our la ws in all jurisdict ions must co nform Co nst it ut io na lly


by treaty to those of the United Nations, much as our state laws had to co nform to those


of the Constitution.”13


The inter na tional “rule of la w” then has t he pote ntial t o gover n muc h mor e t ha n t he


“co nduct o f nations.” It also may gover n the conduct of the individual. In the Council on


Foreign Relations and American Assembly (founded in 1950 by Dwight D. Eisenhower)


1992 work, Rethinking American Security—Beyond Cold War to New World Order, John


H. Bar ton and Barr y E. Carter identify the mo st no table aspects of international law


evolution over the last 50 year s. They recognized that “the individual person has emerged


as an independent actor” demonstrating that “the international system is no longer


co nfined to relations among nations.” And, “national and international tribunals are


offering new—and more effective—means for enforcing international law.”14


Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Bo utros-Ghali provided insight into recent


events related to international law and tribunals. In his 1992 Agenda for Peace, Boutros


Bout ros-Ghali, in an at tempt to re inforce t he role of the Int ernat ional Co urt of Just ic e,


recommended that “all Member States sho uld accept the general jurisdiction of the


Internatio nal Court under Article 36 of its Statute, without any reservation, before the end


of the United Nations Decade of International Law in the year 2000.”15 Note the


similarit y t o Me ndlovit z’s WOMP decade of the 1990s goal of “submission to the


compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice” identified in Chapter 3.


38





The mo st revea ling fulfillment of Ba rton and Car ter’s re velat io n was t he Oct ober


1996 swearing-in ceremony o f twenty-o ne Law of the Seas Tribunal’s Judges by Bo utros


Boutros-Ghali. During his swearing-in statement, Boutros Bo utros-Ghali said: “This is a


situation without precedent in internatio nal law . . . With the establishment of this Tribunal


we ente r a new e ra. The Tr ibunal will be a modern inst itut ion upholding the rule of law


not only between States, but also amo ng States, the International Seabed Authority,


co mpanies and individuals engaged in the exploitation of the international seabed area.”


(emphasis added)16 Boutros Boutro s-Ghali continues with wor ds that seem to be


extracted directly from Bush’s new world o rder speech: “The Tribunal has an important


role to pla y in t he building of an inte rna tional soc iety governed by the rule of law. The


La w of the Sea T ribunal will be part of the syst em fo r peaceful settlement o f disputes as


laid down by t he founders of the United Nations.” (emphasis added)17 It seems like


everyone in the business of new world order is singing from the same sheet of music.


Nearly twenty years ago, Peter Jay, in his 1979 Foreign Affairs ar ticle, “Regionalism


as Geopo lit ics,” not ed that : “The Ca rte r Administrat ion has do ne much in it s UN role…t o


reestablish the American willingness to play by the rules of a system of international


law…But the threads of a particular actio n have no t been woven to gether into a generally


understoo d…doctrine or strategy to capture the imaginatio n and r espect of a suspicious,


cynic al a nd unst able world. That will be a wort hy t ask for a new year, a new decade and,


perhaps, a new pr esidential term.”18 The breakdown of the Soviet Union and the end of


t he Cold War re duced t he suspicion a nd cynicism by crea ting t he perc ept io n of stability.


The 1990s then provided George Bush the oppor tunity to fulfill Ja y’s new wo rld o rder


prophesy. The “rule of law” wheels of international justice are turning; the new world


39





order train has left the station; and, the Americans o n board have no knowledge of the


destination.


 Notes


1Richard A. Falk, Ro bert C. Johansen, and Samuel S. Kim. The Constitutional


Foundations of World Peace (Albany, N.Y. : State University of New York Pr ess, 1993),
149.


2Laura L. Kirmse, “The United Natio ns and the New Wo rld Order,” Conservative


Review (June 1991), 3.


3Graha m Allison, and Grego ry F. Trevert on, eds., Rethinking America’s Security:


Beyond Cold War to New World Order (New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Company,
Inc., 1992), 239.


4Kirmse, 3.


5Ibid., 2.


6Ibid., 3.


7Ibid., 4-5.


8Ibid., 4.


9“ABC’s o f Bricker Amendment,” U.S. News and World Report (22 January 1954),


39.


 10Kirmse, 4.


11Kent and Phoebe Courtney, Disarmament: A Blueprint for Surrender. (La.: Pelican


Printing Company, 1963), 167.


12Kirmse, 4.


13Ibid.


14Allison, 280.


15Bo utros Bo utro s-Ghali, “An Agenda fo r Peace--Preventive Diplomacy,


Peacemaking, and Peace-keeping” Report o f the Secretary-General, 17 June 1992 (On-
line.Internet, 25 March 1997. Available from http://www.un. org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html.),
8.


 16Boutros Boutros-Ghali, United Nations Pr ess Release SG/SM/6089 SEA/1534, 18


October 1996 (On-line. Internet, 25 March 1997. Available from http://www.un.or g.), 1-
2.


 17Ibid., 2.


18Pet er Jay, “Re gionalism as Geo politics.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3 (1979),


514.


40





Chapter 6


The Road to New World Order


Something of a world-wide order has been set up, by the general consent
of mankind, and is in active work, of which it is impossible to say that any
parallel existed before.


 —F. S. Marvin


The New World-Order, 1932


World o rder as a set o f co ncepts, objectives, and str ategies is anything but “new.”


George Bush was no t the father of new wo rld o rder thinking, just an advocate that


happened to be in the right position at the right time to flame the fires of the next


significant thr ust in the evolutionary development of wo rld o rder. The Bush instigated


post-Cold War new world order thrust can be interpreted as the third major attempt in this


century to create a world ordered by a “credible” universal authority enfo rcing the


international “rule of law” through collective secur ity measures, po lice actio n or


“peacekeeping.” The “visio n” of world o rder has remained fairly constant throughout this


ce nt ury; specific st rat egies for a tt ainment, t hough, ha ve var ie d widely. The climax of t he


three most significant world emotional events in this century, World War I, World War II,


and the Co ld War, have pro vided the catalyst for successive attempts at new wo rld order.


The first two attempts were manifested in the form of the League of Nations and the


Unit ed Nat io ns. The t hird a tt empt a t ac hie ving new world orde r is much more complex,


41





amor phous, and difficult to distinguish. Discernment of the third attempt is the subject o f


this chapter.


 Third Try at New World Order


The epigraph quote on the previous page by F. S. Marvin referred to the world o rder


precedent set by the formation of the League of Nations. Marvin was careful to point out,


though, that the League was an important symbol, but not the genesis or end-all of world


order: “World co-o peration, of which the League of Nations is the symbol and the chief


organ, is the character istic of the new age…”1 He provides further clarification by


describing the new wo rld orde r goal and limite d ro le o f the Lea gue: “The Lea gue then,


tho ugh the chief political fact since the War, sho uld be regarded as a part only of a great


movement and set of orga niz at io ns a ll ha ving as t he ir purpose to implement t his new


co nsciousness o f world-unit y.…Nat ionality must rank below t he claims of mankind a s a


who le, but in it s immediat e e ffect s on individuals it is o f great er mo me nt .” 2 So, we can


see that 65 years ago, there was perceived to be a new world o rder mo vement to war ds


world unity and decreased nationality/sovereignty. The League was an unparalleled


symbol of the movement, but a symbol no netheless. The League, as a mechanism o f the


world or der moveme nt , failed to fulfill expec tat ions large ly due t o lack of support from


isolationist Americans.


Recall from Chapter 2 the framework fo r the League of Nations was formulated by


the “Inquiry”—the predecesso r to the Council o n Fo reign Relations Wo rld War II War


and Peace Studies. World War I I conveniently provided an o pportunity fo r the “founders


of the UN” to pro pose a second attempt at wor ld order which wo uld presumably acco unt


42





for the flaws inherent in the League structure. In Michael Wala’s words: “The Council


members, like so many o ther internationalists, were convinced that the United States


sho uld not let this ‘seco nd chance’ to participate in a supranational organization


evaporate.”3


The establishment of the United Nations became the second attempt. Although mo re


successful than its predecessor, the UN again failed to meet new wo rld order expectatio ns


largely because of the Cold War frictio n between the United States and the So viet Union.


Internatio nal dynamics had to change for the wo rld to accept a “credible” UN fulfilling t he


“vision” of its “founder s.” The t rigger event was t he fa ll of the Ber lin Wall and


co rresponding end t o t he Cold War. The fac t, though, is t he t hird at t empt, very dissimilar


to the first two, was well under way prior to that event. Evidence of this was provided by


Harlan Cleveland, fo rmer Assistant Secretary of State, fo rmer Ambassador to NATO, and


member of the Co uncil on Foreign Relations, in his co mments regarding a 1976 repor t he


helped author, United Nations, released by the Senate Co mmittee o n Foreign Relations: “I


hope t ha t in t he hea ring and what ever report is relea sed by the Committ ee , you will make


a distinction between the future of the United Nations and the future of world o rder.


There is a long agenda of creative effo rt just ahead, a complex agenda of international


action…Taking it all together, this amounts to a third try at world order—the League of


Natio ns having died and the United Natio ns being unable in its present conditio n to co pe.”


(emphasis added)4


43





New World Order Paths


The third attempt, more co mplicated than the other s, involves traversing thr ee


interlinked paths that pave the road to world order . One path involves strengthening the


powers of the United Nations and its associated institutions to enhance their world


authority. The seco nd path on the road to new world order is through evolutio nary


regio nalism. The idea is to develop r egional entities that bind states thr ough super-state


polit ical, ec onomic, and lega l arrangeme nt s. The t hird pat h is built on the foundat ion of


piecemeal functionalism whereby functio nal issues such as economics and tr ade,


environmental conser vation, and weapons o f mass destruction proliferation drive


international interdependence and further international law constraints. Much of


“piecemeal functionalism” is directly related to UN subsidiaries. The following sectio ns


briefly describe the historical and r ecent support fo r the thr ee paths on the road to world


order.


United Nations Strengthening


The call for strengthening the United Natio ns from the world o rder advocates has


been strong and consistent. Robert Ducci in his 1964 Foreign Affairs article, “The World


Order in the Sixties,” said that: “It is indeed difficult to see how the world order is to be


kept . . . unless the United Nations undergoes a thor ough overhaul. No t inco nceivably the


two present superpowers may one day agree that the strengthening of the United Natio ns


might be in the interest of bo th.…If that happens, the future organizatio n of the world


might no t be ve ry dissimilar in principle fr om t he o ne which was drafte d in Dumbart on


Oaks 20 years ago by the victors of World War II.”5


44





A detailed plan for strengthening the UN was articulated by John Logue, Vice-


President of World Federalist Association. On December 4, 1985, he gave the following


t est imony t o t he Human Right s and Inte rna tional Organiza tion subcommit tee of t he House


Foreign Affairs Committee joint hearing on the United Nations:


It is time to tell the world’s people not what they want to hear, but what
they ought to hear.…[W]e must reform, restructure and strengthen the
United Natio ns and give it the power and author ity and funds to keep the
peace and promote justice. The Security Council veto must go. One-
nation, o ne-vo te must go. The United Nations must have taxing power or
some o ther dependable sour ce of revenue. It must have a large
peacekeeping force. It must be able to supervise the dismantling and
destr uctio n of nuclear and other majo r weapo ns systems. In appro priate
area, particularly in the area of peace and security, it must be able to make
and enforce law on the individual.6


Over the last few years, almo st all of those recommendations have been pursued by


the United Nations and its supporters. As one example, Boutros Boutros-Ghali was aided


by the Ford Foundation (tax-exempt foundation link to financing new world o rder


strategies) in creating an adviso ry group o f financial specialists and bankers to identify


“dependable so urces of revenue.” Their recommendations included imposing a UN tax on


international plane tickets. 7 Another example was the previo usly discussed establishment


of the International Law of the Sea Tribunal providing the mechanism “to make and


enforce law on the individual.”


The continuo us strengthening and legitimization of the UN sets the stage for Bush’s


observation that: “Not since 1945 have we seen the real po ssibility of using t he Unit ed


Nations as it was designed…”8


45





Trilateral Regionalism


The strategy of building world order on the framework o f regionalism has also been


aro und for quite some time. In 1929, N. S. B. Gras in his Foreign Affairs article,


“Regionalism a nd Nat ionalism,” st at ed: “The dire ct e ffect of re gionalism may be to ma ke


the state weaker politically but stro nger economically and socially. Or the regio n, looking


to regional convenience, may make new alignments leading to the creation of new states,


or to international states (European, American, and so on), or ultimately to a world


state.”9 Gras emphasized the impo rtance o f the r egion to a “super-state o f some kind.”


The “region, which because it is nearer to the individual, is likely to exercise a more potent


influence over him.”10 A reasonably accurate fulfillme nt o f t his vision is found in t he


Eur opean Co mmunit y which is we ll on its way t o be coming a super-sta te co nt aining it s


own political, economic, and judicial systems.


A more radical concept in the evolutionary development of world o rder regionalism


was presented in 1949 by Maurice Parmelee in Geo-Economic Regionalism and World


Federation: “There can be no permanent peace so long as each nation retains its


sovereignty. There can be no effective world o rganizatio n to solve the eco no mic and


social problems of ma nkind so lo ng a s t he nat ion is t he unit of o rganizat ion. T he region,


limiting nat ional sovereignt y a nd furnishing a suit able unit of orga niz atio n for a world


federation, is a practicable solutio n. ”11 Parmelee further specifies that, “regionalism


postulates interdependence…rather than self-sufficiency,” and that, “geo-economic


regionalism is by far the most constructive proposal for the future of the world.”12


In fact, geo -eco no mic, interdependent regionalism is exactly the policy advocated and


pursued over the last twenty-five years by the Trilateral Commission. The Trilateral


46





Commission was founded in July 1973 by David Rockefeller , then Council on Foreign


Relations Chairman of the Board. Its purpo se was pr eviewed by Zbigniew Brzezinski,


former National Security Advisor, Council Directo r, and Tr ilater al Commission President,


in his 1973 Foreign Affairs article when he stated that, “the active promotion of such


trilateral [American-Euro pean-Japanese] cooperation must now become the central


priority of U.S. policy.”13 Brzezinski and the Trilateral Commission took their mission


very seriously: “Creation of the Trilateral Commission reflects an awareness that the


present moment is of very great importance for the future of mankind.”14


With t he Cold Wa r still at t he forefront of int ernat ional re latio ns, t he T rilat eral


Commission seemed somewhat omniscient when in the 1970s they o bserved that the,


“bipolar leadership system of the co ld war is diffusing into what may be the first truly


global political system, with many actor s playing significant parts at different levels.”15


The T rila te ral Commission reco gnize d t hat t his third at te mpt at wor ld or der, building a


“global polit ic al syst em” primar ily t hro ugh e conomic int erdependenc e, would not c ome


quickly:


The r enovatio n of the int ernat ional system will be a ve ry prolonged
process. The system created after World War II was created thr ough an
ac t of will and human initiat ive in a relat ively rest rict ed pe riod of t ime.
One power had overwhe lming might and influe nc e, a nd ot he rs we re c lose ly
asso ciat ed with it . In c ontra st , a renovat ed int ernat ional syste m will now
require a process of cr eation--much longer and more complex--a process in
whic h pr olonged negot iat ions will ha ve t o be e nga ged a nd developed. In
nurtur ing habits and practices o f working together among the trilateral
regions, the Commission should help set the context for these necessary
efforts.16


The Co mmissio n’s primary undertaking was to create a new internatio nal economic


order through trilateral cooperatio n. So me o f their ear ly successes were highlighted by


47





former Washington Po st reporter, Jeremiah Novak: “Acco rding to sources in the State


Depart ment, t he t rilat eral pape rs have dire ct ly influenced t he summoning of t he


Rambouillet and Pue rto Rican c onfe rences, t he sale o f I MF gold, t he L aw of the Se a


co nferences, the formation of the Internatio nal Energy Agency, and steps to establish a


new international currency, which replaces the U.S. dollar and gold. The commission’s


record and its powerful influence after the 1976 electio ns deserve a great deal of


respect.”17


Recall t ha t t rilate ral regionalism re presents only one world order pa th. In the wor ds


of Willia m Ho ar, “T rila te ralism…is only a way st at ion on the road t o t he New World


Order.”18 Bo utros Boutros-Ghali provided the contempo rary linkage between regionalism


and the fir st path to wor ld o rder, UN strengthening. In his “Agenda fo r Peace” speech,


Boutros-Ghali said, “…regional arrangements or agencies can render great service if their


activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the


Charter…”19 His fo cus at that point was security arrangements, but the concept of


regional linkage to UN authority applies universally.


Not to lose sight of the objective of this analysis—interpreting George Bush’s


meaning of “new world o rder”—it is important to come full cycle to Bush’s vision as


art iculat ed t o t he Unit ed Na tions Ge ne ral Assembly: “ I se e a wo rld building on t he


emerging new model of European unity—not just Europe but the whole world whole and


free.”20


Piecemeal Functionalism


The final, and most intriguing path supporting the third attempt at wor ld order is


referred to as piecemeal functio nalism. Sever al Co uncil on Fo reign Relatio ns related


48





authors and studies have advocated world order strategies based on piecemeal


functionalism. The Trilateral Commission recommends piecemeal functio nalism as a


means of achieving the interdependence between natio ns and regions as discussed in the


previous section. The 1977 Trilateral Commission Task Fo rce Repo rt, Towards a


Renovated International System, laid out a specific definition and strategy fo r piecemeal


functionalism: “In general, the pr ospects for achieving effective international co operation


can often be improved if the issues can be kept separate—what we call piecemeal


functionalism.…Coalitions of specialists can be built acro ss national bo undaries in specific


functional areas, blunting the natio nalism that might o therwise hinder international


agre ement. …The same c ountries whic h will oft en indulge in fanciful r he tor ic in a bro ad,


multipurpo se organizat ion (such as various UN agencies) will oft en be negot iating


seriously and cooperatively in another organization (such as GATT) on the same issue at


the very same time.” (emphasis added)21


Richard N. Gardner, former Carter advisor, Ambassador to Italy, Council member,


and Columbia Univer sity law pro fessor, presented the most r evealing look at an integrated


new wo rld order strategy in his 1974 Foreign Affairs article, “The Har d Road to World


Order” He answered the call for an inno vative third attempt at world o rder by advocating


a decentralized functional—”piecemeal functio nalism”—appro ach anchored by the “rule


of law” and integrated with the United Nations:


In this unhappy state of affairs, few people retain much confidence in the
more ambitio us strategies for world order that had wide backing a
generation ago . . . If instant world government, Charter review, and a
greatly strengthened International Court do not provide the answers, what
hope for progress is there ? T he answer will not sa tisfy those who seek
simple so lut ions to complex proble ms, but it co me s down e ssentia lly t o
this: The hope for the fo reseeable future lies, not in building up a few


49





ambitio us cent ral instit utions o f unive rsa l me mber ship and ge neral
jurisdiction as was envisaged at the end of the last war, but rather in the
much mor e decentralized, disor derly and pragmatic pro cess of inventing or
ada pting inst itut ions o f limit ed jurisdict io n and select ed membe rship t o deal
with specific pro blems on a case-by- case basis, as the necessity for
co operat ion is perc eived by re le vant na tions. Such instit utions of limit ed
jurisdic tion will ha ve a bet te r chance of doing what must be do ne to make a
‘rule of law’ possible among nations . . . In short, the ‘house of world
orde r’ will have t o be built from t he bo tt om up ra ther than fro m t he t op
down. It will look like a gre at ‘booming, buz zing co nfusio n, ’…but a n end
run around national sovereignty, eroding it piece by piece, will accomplish
much more than an old-fashioned fr ontal a ssault . Of co urse , fo r polit ical,
as well as administrative reasons, some of these specialized arr angements
sho uld be bro ught into an appropriate relationship with the central
institutions of the UN system….22


Ga rdne r’s spe cific func tiona l inst itut ion-building issues we re: t he int ernat ional


monetary system, international tr ade, environment, populatio n explo sion, food shortages,


the wo rld’s oceans, weapons proliferation, and peacekeeping.23 All of those issues have


indeed been catalysts for international actio n over the last twenty-three years. It’s


apparent that the internatio nal growth o f interdependence at the functional level that we


have experienced over the last quarter of a century may not have been the result of


random “booming, buzzing confusion,” but in fact a more calculated strategy o f world


order. Twenty-three years seems to be beyond the planning r ange of most, but not


Gardner and certainly no t the Council. Gardner realistically explained that: “So me may


object that a generation of arduous and possibly futile negotiatio ns on specific functional


problems is not a ve ry inspiring pro spec t.…T he roa d to wo rld order will st ill be a long and


hard o ne, but since the sho rt cuts do not lead anywhere we have no cho ice but to take


it.”24


50





Notes


1F. S. Marvin, ed., The New World-Order. (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries


Press, Inc., First published 1932, reprinted 1967), 8.


2Ibid., 3.


3Michael Wala, The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in


the Early Cold War (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn Books, 1994), 42.


4Gary Allen, Say “No!” to the New World Order (Seal Beach, Calif: Conco rd Press,


1987), 58.


5Roberto Ducci, “The World Order of the Sixties,” Foreign Affairs (April 1964), 390.


6Gary Allen, 54.


7Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Groping for a New World Order,” U.S. News & World


Report (28 September 1992), 52.


8Geo rge Bush, “The UN: World Parliament of Peace, ” Addr ess before the United


Natio ns General Assembly, New York City, October 1, 1990. US Department of State
Dispatch (8 October 1990), 151.


9N. S. Gra s, “Regionalism and Nat ionalism, ” Foreign Affairs Vol 7, No 3 (April


1929), 466.


10Gras, 467.


11Maurice Parmelee, Geo-Economic Regionalism and World Federation (New York,


N.Y.: Exposition Press, 1949), v.


12Parmelle, 1-3.


13Zbigniew Brzezinski, “U.S. Fo reign Policy: The Search fo r Focus,” Foreign Affairs


(July 1973), 723.


14Trilateral Commission Task Force Reports: 1-7. A Compilation of Reports from


the First Two Years of the Trilateral Co mmission (New York, N.Y.: New Yo rk University
Press, 1977), 53.


15Ibid.


16Richar d N. Coo per, Karl Kaiser, and Masataka Kosaka. Towards a Renovated


International System, A Report of the Trilateral Integrators Task Force to The Trilateral
Commission (New York, N.Y.: The Trilateral Commission, 1977), inside back cover.


17Jere mia h No va k, “T rilat eralism: A New World System,” America (5 February


1977), 96.


18William P. Hoar, “The New World Order,” American Opinion (April 1977), 101.


19Bo utros Bo utro s-Ghali, “An Agenda fo r Peace--Preventive Diplomacy,


Peacemaking, and Peace-keeping” Report o f the Secretary-General, 17 June 1992 (On-
line. Internet, 25 March 1997. Available from http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html.,
13.


 20Geor ge Bush, “The UN: World Par liament of Peace, ” Address before the United


Natio ns General Assembly, New York City, October 1, 1990. US Department of State
Dispatch (8 October 1990), 152.


21Cooper, Kaiser, and Kosaka, 32-33.


22Richard N. Gardner, “The Hard Road to World Order,” Foreign Affairs (April


1974), 558-559.


23Ibid., 559-562.


51





Notes


24Ibid., 576.


52





Chapter 7


New World Order Implications


The intent of this paper was to derive some conclusions about the strategic


environment and prospect s for t he ne w millennium based on the inte rpret at ion of Geo rge


Bush’s new world order—where the “rule of law go verns the conduct of nations,” and a


“credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill t he promise a nd visio n of


the UN’s founders.”1 This a uthor’s pe rspec tive of Bush’s ne w wo rld or der will be briefly


recapped . First, the Council on Foreign Relations and o ther clo sely linked o rganizations


have significantly shaped the new world order vision and strategy for achievement of that


vision. Second, tho se or ganizatio ns have demonstrated a significant influence on the


foreign policy pro cess of the United States. Third, the new world o rder vision consists o f


a transition of sovereignty from the state to the internatio nal level; incr eased authority,


security, and judicial powers of the United Nations; a shift in focus from national to


“co mmo n” interests; collective vs. unilateral security actions; enhanced social and


ec onomic inte rdependence t hr ough func tionalism; a nd so me level o f milit ary disarmame nt


of t he nat ion sta tes. Fo urth, Unite d Nat io ns c redibilit y is essent ial t o t he fulfillment of t he


new world order vision and contingent upon achievement of its envisioned


peacekeeping/international police role o f applying collective force against violators o f the


“rule of law.” And, fifth, the third attempt at new world or der co nsists of a complex


53





stra tegy involving t he stre ngt hening of t he UN, e nhancing regionalism, a nd incre asing


interdependence through piecemeal functionalism.


The implica tions o f ne w world o rderism, taken independently, do not appear to be


surprising revelations. Taken as a who le and taken within the context of the new world


order vision laid out over the past chapters, these implications may raise some concern.


Multilevel Interdependence


The first co nclusion drawn from this analysis involves the structur e of the


international system. One of the cur rent ho t topics of political discussion is projecting the


nat ure of t he po st -Cold Wa r int ernat ional syst em. The simple bipo la r st ruct ure no longer


exists. Many scholars present variations of what Daniel S. Papp calls the three primary


possibilities—”a unipolar wo rld based on Ame rican milit ary might, a regionalize d world


organized around three economic trading blocs, and a multipolar world based on several


measures o f natio na l and int ernat ional ca pabilit ies.”2 The truth, though, is that the


co mplexity of the strategy for wor ld o rder drives an inter national structur e that does not


lend it self to simple mode ls. Joseph Nye , a T rila te ral Co mmission aut ho r, provides t he


most de scr ipt ive world analogy in his model t ermed “mult ile vel int erde pendence.” In a


1992 Foreign Affairs art icle, he said: “T he dist ribution of po wer in wo rld politic s has


beco me like a la ye r cake. T he t op milita ry la yer is large ly unipolar, for t here is no ot her


militar y power c omparable t o t he Unite d St ate s. The economic middle layer is t ripolar


and has been for two decades. The botto m layer of transnational interdependence shows a


diffusion of power.”3 No te the reflection of trilateral r egionalism and piecemeal


func tionalism in t his model. He adds t ha t: “Power is beco ming more mult idime nsional,


54





structures mo re complex and states themselves more permeable.”4 St at e permea bilit y


implies the leakage o r transfer of national authority and sovereignty to some other


medium. One willing and active recipient is the United Nations.


United Nations


Sovereignty


Boutro s Bo utros-Ghali in his 1992 Agenda for Peace first emphasized that respect for


the state’s “fundamental so vereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international


progress.” Then he refined his statement by declaring that, “The time of absolute and


exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by r eality. It is


the task of States today to understand this…”5 The attack on national so vereignty is real,


but subtle. The League of Natio ns failed in part because of its over t grab at national


sovereignty. The UN proponents are careful not to repeat that mistake. Joseph Nye


predic ts t ha t “mult inatio na l infringement of so ve reignty will gradua lly incre ase without


suddenly disrupting the distribution of power.”6


Foreign Affairs published an article in 1996 by conservative Senato r Jesse Helms


which, not surprisingly, was critical of the United Nations’ attempt to dissolve national


sovereignty. Senator Helms, who was severely blasted in the letters to the editor of the


following Foreign Affairs issue, said t ha t, “t he Unit ed Na tions is being tr ansformed from


an instit ution of so ve reign nat ions int o a quasi-sovereign ent ity in itself. That


transformation represents an obvio us threat to U.S. national interests.” He co ntinues by


not ing t hat , “the Unite d Na tions ha s moved from fac ilit at ing diplo macy among nat ion-


states to supplanting them altogether. The international elites running the United Natio ns


55





look at the idea of the nation-state with disdain; they consider it a discredited notion of the


past that has been superseded by the idea of the United Nations. In their view, the


interests of nation-states are parochial and should give way to global interests. Nation-


states, they believe, should recognize the primacy of these global interests and accede to


the United Nations’ sovereignty to pursue them.”7


The subtle co mplexity by which the United Nations is likely to enhance their


sovereignty at the expense of the sovereignty of the states is best described by a model


presented by Farida Aziz in his wo rk, New World Order, the 21st Century. He astutely


co ncludes that, “the wo rld is no w witnessing, in fact, an attempt…to establish a


‘condominium mode l’ of a world order, in lie u of a world government , in whic h t he st at e


sovereignty would be modified fro m the ‘freeho ld’ title to the ‘leaseho ld’ title, and in


whic h t he t erms of the le ase will c onform t o t he ‘rules’ of the condominium. Those ‘rule s’


will be est ablished and enfor ced by a Boa rd of Direct ors.…The Boa rd meet ings will t ake


place in the UN Security Council.”8 This analo gy nicely integrates the “rule of law”


co ncept and resolves the dichotomy o f Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s statement apparently


suppo rtive of fundamental state sovereignty yet against exclusive state sovereignty. State


sovereignty will be r elegat ed t o “leasehold” act ivit ies under t he “rule of law governing t he


co nduct o f nations.” The landlord becomes the United Nations and the lease enforcement


mechanism is international “peacekeeping.”


Peacekeeping


With t he de cline of sta te so ve reignty will come t he incre ase in types and fre quency of


United Natio ns peacekeeping actions. Recall that to be “credible,” the UN must develop


t he capa bilit y to enforce interna tional order. Under the vision o f its founders, t his


56





co lle ctive securit y mec ha nism was to be a UN milita ry force unde r Se curit y Council


co ntrol. When those key elements did not materialize, the UN pursued a r ole not


originally foreseen--”peacekeeping.” No w that the United Nations is within sight o f


fulfilling t he vision of it s founders, the “peacekeeping” concept must be expanded to


enco mpass world order enfo rcement. “Peacekeeping” is a convenient phrase to spin- off of


because of its non-threatening nature. Therefore, “peacekeeping” operations will


co mpr ise a bro ader spec trum of milit ary and non-milita ry a ct io ns. Se na to r Helms ha s


already co ncluded that, “peacekeeping has evolved into a term without meaning. It is


used to justify all sorts of UN activities…”9


Bruce Russett, for mer Director of the Executive Office o f the UN Secretar y General,


and James S. Sutterlin present a co mprehensive discussio n of the UN collective security


and peacekeeping roles in their 1991 Foreign Affairs article, “The UN in a New World


Order.” They also note the flexible application o f the ter m peacekeeping: “Since the Suez


crisis o f 1956, the United Nations has developed a notable elasticity in using peacekeeping


forces, to the point that it is now difficult t o formulat e a pre cise definition--or t he limit s—


of…peacekeeping.…This flexibility grea tly enhances the va lue of peacekeeping fo rces as


an instrument available t o the Sec urity Council in dealing with pote nt ial or e xisting


co nflict s.” 10 Their most re ve aling obse rvatio n is t ha t, “not hing in the chart er prohibits t he


Security Council from deploying peacekeeping fo rces without consent of all parties, or


from including tro op contingents fro m the permanent members of the council in such


forces where the need for deterrence arises.”11 So the concept o f Security Council


decision making autonomy is introduced. That auto no my is an integral aspect of UN


“credibility.”


57





Many inter nationalists now advocate full execution of Article 43 o f the UN Charter


whereby member nations make units of their armed forces available for UN enforcement


actions in accordance with special agreements between themselves and the Security


Council. Boutros Bo utros-Ghali reinforced the concept when he declared: “Stand-by


arrangements sho uld be confirmed…between the Secretariat and Member States


co nc erning t he kind and numbe r o f skille d pe rso nnel t he y will be prepa red to offer t he


United Nations as the needs of new operations arise.”12 Richar d Gardner more specifically


addre sses the possibilit y o f Sec urity Council a uto no my in his explanat ion of t he benefits of


full impleme nt at ion of Art icle 43: “It wo uld const itut e a tr ue UN milit ary force, wit h a UN


co mma nde r responsible t o direc tion by the Sec urity Council wit h t he advice o f t he Milit ary


Staff Co mmittee.…In addition, under the UN Participatio n Act, once an Article 43


agreement between the United States and the Secur ity Council is concluded and approved


by t he Senat e, U.S. forc es designa ted unde r t he agre ement can be sent into host ilities


without further action by Congress.”13


The Senat e is probably no t re ady to sign up t o tha t level of Unit ed St at es commit me nt


t o t he UN in the near future , but a move in t hat direc tion is possible. T he shift will like ly


co me in the form of appor tioned rapid deployment fo rces fully tr ained in and available for


UN operations. This co ncept is widely advocated by likes of Boutros Bo utro s-Ghali,


Richard Gardner, Joseph Nye, and many others. Boutros Boutros- Ghali envisio ns the


ca pabilit y for a 24-hour c all-up cont inge nc y force sourc ed fr om any o f a number of


nations.14 Gardner and Nye intuitively highlight the necessity of common training and


multinational exercises to develo p an effective UN command and control structure and


operatio nal procedures.15 The Unit ed St at es is like ly t o move in t his dire ctio n—e nhancing


58





UN peacekeeping r elated doctrine, training, and exercises, while for the meantime,


maintaining control over commitment of forces.


Common vs. National Interests


The commit me nt of force s t o UN peacekeeping missions will most likely continue t o


increa se, t ho ugh. The princ iple driver will be t he shift of emphasis of the Ame rican


leade rship from t he prot ect ion o f vit al nat ional inte rest s as co mmit ment crite ria t o t he


prot ec tion of “c ommon” wo rld int erests. This is a re flec tion of the int erdepe nde nc e


created by years of piecemeal functionalism. The Washington Times pr esented an


interesting perspective on the relationship between the UN, new world order, and U.S.


interests in an April 18, 1986 article: “A repo rt by the General Accounting Office analyzed


90 UN media programs between 1983 and 1985 on apartheid, disarmament, ‘new world


order’ and Palestine. Only one supported U.S. interests.” (emphasis added)16


Will t he Unit ed St at es se nd Americ an soldiers acr oss t he globe to suppo rt UN actio ns


that may not directly support United States interests? We have and we will.  George Bush


clearly articulated his position on this issue in his “To war d a New Wo rld Order” speech to


Congress. He emphatically stated: “America and the world must defend common vital


inte rest s. And we will.” (emphasis a dded)17 We have already seen a dilutio n of the


meaning and applicatio n of “national vital interests.” The co ncept o f “common vital


interests” is even mo re fluid, and can be used to justify United States involvement in


almost any contingency. Conse quently, as the UN gr ows in st rength, we will like ly


experie nc e incre ase d United Sta tes milit ary ope ratio ns t empo suppor ting mor e ambiguous


missions. At t he same time, milit ary force struct ure will c ontinue to decline due t o budget


and new world order pressures.


59





Again, nothing is particularly new about the “new world order.” The issues of armed


force, so vereignty, and natio nal interests have been the focus o f world order discussio ns


and reco mmendations for decades. The “fo unders of the UN,” though, just seem to have


a particularly peculiar vision that has survived through years of evo lution of the


inte rna tional syst em. For me r Council on Fore ign Rela tions membe r and influe nt ial


Kennedy administration State Department Official, Walt Whitman Ro stow in his 1960


work, The United States in the World Arena , said: “I t is a legitima te Ame ric an nat ional


objective to see remo ved fro m all nations—including the United States—the right to use


subst antial milit ary fo rce to pursue t heir own inte rests. Since this residual right is the root


of national so vereignty, and the basis for existence of an internatio nal arena of power, it is,


therefore, an American interest to see an end to nationhood as it has been historically


defined.”18 An odd interpretation of national interests, indeed!


Summary


The r oad to new wo rld order at the international level is somewhat comparable to the


path this country has taken over the past two hundred years at the national level. Our


founding fathers perceived the states to be the so vereign fo undation of the United States


of America, with the central government only exercising contro l over those areas allowed


by the states. But, as time passed and the central government grew in power and size, the


states lost mo re and more of their sovereignty. Each successive gain of authority at the


central level was justified on the basis of altruistic motives. But, one day the country


wakes up to discover that the altruistic piecemeal expansion has resulted in a blo ated


60





bureauc racy t ha t consume d count less valuable resource s, limit ed st at e free doms, and


created a debt structure that no generation is likely to recover from.


Wha t is t o say t hat the sa me will no t ha ppen at t he int ernat ional level? The na tion


states are espoused by the likes of Boutro s Boutros-Ghali as the so vereign fo undation of


the new world order just as our country’s states were the sovereign foundation of


America. But as with our federal government, achievement o f the new world order is


co ntingent upon shifting that sovereignty from the state to central level. Again, the


justification is righteous—peace and prosperity for all mankind. What will be t he end


result, though? Bloated bureaucracy, limited freedoms, and international debt?


Many internationalists argue that the only way to end war s is through the creatio n of


a new world order based on wor ld authority and collective security. The trouble that


co me s wit h t hat new world orde r will be o ve rshado wed by t he be ne fit of peace and


prosperity. The pro blem is that all governmental entities ar e run by peo ple. And not all


peo ple have the purest o f motives. International “peacekeeping” may no t always be used


in an altruistic manner. Hundreds of year s ago, the Old Testament prophet, Daniel,


prophesied that in the end times “a king of fierce co untenance…shall stand up…and by


peace shall destroy many.” 19


Current momentum favors implement at ion of t he inte rnatio na list world o rder model


as a dvocat ed by Ge orge Bush. Succ ess, though, will be depe nde nt upon the dyna mics of


world po litics. Ther e are too many factors and unknowns in the world to declare new


world order victory, but continued progress in that direction seems inevitable.


61





Notes


1George Bush, “Operation Desert Storm Launched,” Address to the Nation from the


White House, 16 January 1991. US Department of State Dispatch (21 January 1991), 38.


2Daniel S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations (New York, N.Y.:


Macmillan College Publishing Company, 1994), 207.


3Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “What New World Order?” Foreign Affairs (Spring 1992), 88.


4Ibid.


5Bo utro s Bo utros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace-- Preventive Diplomacy,


Peacemaking, and Peace-keeping” Report o f the Secretary-General, 17 June 1992 (On-
line.Internet, 25 March 1997. Available from http://www.un. org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html.),
3.


 6Nye, 93.


7Jesse Helms, “Fixing the UN,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 1996), 2-3.


8Farida J. Aziz, New World Order, the 21st Century (Isla mabad: Mo nz a Corporat ion,


1992), 17.


9Helms, 6.


10Bruce Russett and James Sutterlin, “The UN in a New Wo rld Order, ” Foreign


Affairs (Spring, 1991), 70.


11Ibid., 71-72.


12Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace,” 11.


13Graham Allison, and Gregory F. Tre verto n, eds., Rethinking America’s Security:


Beyond Cold War to New World Order (New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Company,
Inc., 1992), 274-275.


14Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Groping for a New World Order,” U.S. News & World


Report (28 September 1992), 52.


15Nye, 93; Allison, 273.


16Gary Alle n, Say “No!” to the New World Order (Seal Beach, Calif: Concord Press,


1987), 17.


17Geo rge Bush, “Toward a New World Order ,” Address before a jo int session o f


Congress, Washington, D.C. , September 11, 1990. US Department of State Dispatch (17
September 1990), 92.


18Kent and Phoebe Courtney, Disarmament: A Blueprint for Surrender. (La.: Pelican


Printing Company, 1963), 50.


19The Holy Bible, King James Version, Scofield Reference, (New York, N.Y.: Oxford


University Press, 1945), 913.


62





Chapter 8


Final Thoughts


In this author’s asse ssment, the Gulf War was a co rne rst one event in the fulfillment of


t he inter na tionalist vision of world orde r. The UN sanct io ne d c ollect ive multinat ional


militar y ret ribut ion a gainst a n aggre ssor na tion that violat ed the t errit orial int egrit y of a


nation state validated the concept o f wo rld order and provided the catalyst for the


culminat ing third a tt empt at “ ne w wor ld order. ” They key is not to view t he Gulf Wa r as


a specific mo del fo r future UN actions, but as a trigger event that jumped the evo lution o f


the internatio nal system from its derailed Cold War state back on the tracks or road to


new world order. Bush recognized the significance of this event as evidenced by his


statement to the UN General Assembly: “And when the Soviet Unio n agreed with so many


of us here in the United Nations to condemn the aggression o f Iraq, there co uld be no


doubt…that we had, indeed, put decades of history behind us.”1


There has been a lot of co njecture over the reaso n for terminating the Gulf War


ground offensive at 100 hours. One candidate explanation has to be that at the 100-hour


point all UN objectives had been met. The United States had not achieved its o wn


objective of destro ying the Republican Guard, but as a collective security force, the


co alition had fulfille d all t he re quir ements of t he UN resolutio n. T hat est ablished t he


precedent for a “credible United Natio ns” to use its “peacekeeping role” against


63





international aggressor s under the “rule o f law.” The cornersto ne had been laid for the


final fulfillment of the “promise and vision of the UN’s founders.”


Notes


1Geo rge Bush, “The UN: World Parliament of Peace, ” Addr ess before the United


Natio ns General Assembly, New York City, October 1, 1990. US Department of State
Dispatch (8 October 1990), 151.


64





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