Iraqis Abused by U.S. Personnel - Military Documents

BCST 8/27/06
9/11 ACCOUNTABILTY Vs. "The Case For Impeachment"


Part 1 
Part 2 
Part 3 
Part 4 
Part 5 
Part 6 
Part 7
Part 7 

UPDATE: 12/29/05
Confidential letters from Ambassador Craig Murray...
See 1/3 way down page:


53 Page Prison Abuse Report
24 Page Red Cross Report

AR 190-8 Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees 

FM 34-52


Congressional Code of Military Criminal Law
applicable to all military members worldwide.


U.S. Military
Punitive Articles of the UCMJ

Article 93—Cruelty and maltreatment

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• Court Martials
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"Any person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty toward, or oppression or maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."


(1) That a certain person was subject to the orders of the accused; and

(2) That the accused was cruel toward, or oppressed, or maltreated that person.


(1) Nature of victim. "Any person subject to his orders" means not only those persons under the direct or immediate command of the accused but extends to all persons, subject to the code or not, who by reason of some duty are required to obey the lawful orders of the accused, regardless whether the accused is in the direct chain of command over the person.

(2) Nature of act. The cruelty, oppression, or maltreatment, although not necessarily physical, must be measured by an objective standard. Assault, improper punishment, and sexual harassment may constitute this offense. Sexual harassment includes influencing, offering to influence, or threatening the career, pay, or job of another person in exchange for sexual favors, and deliberate or repeated offensive comments or gestures of a sexual nature. The imposition of necessary or proper duties and the exaction of their performance does not constitute this offense even though the duties are arduous or hazardous or both.


Maximum punishment.

Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 1 year.

Lesser included offense


Article 80--attempts


Punitive Articles of the UCMJ


Article 80—Attempts


“(a) An act, done with specific intent to commit an offense under this chapter, amounting to more than mere preparation and tending, even though failing, to effect its commission, is an attempt to commit that offense.

(b) Any person subject to this chapter who attempts to commit any offense punishable by this chapter shall be punished as a court-martial may direct, unless otherwise specifically prescribed.

(c) Any person subject to this chapter may be convicted of an attempt to commit an offense although it appears on the trial that the offense was consummated.”


(1) That the accused did a certain overt act;

(2) That the act was done with the specific intent to commit a certain offense under the code;

(3) That the act amounted to more than mere preparation; and

(4) That the act apparently tended to effect the commission of the intended offense.


(1) In general. To constitute an attempt there must be a specific intent to commit the offense accompanied by an overt act which directly tends to accomplish the unlawful purpose.

(2) More than preparation. Preparation consists of devising or arranging the means or measures necessary for the commission of the offense. The overt act required goes beyond preparatory steps and is a direct movement toward the commission of the offense. For example, a purchase of matches with the intent to burn a haystack is not an attempt to commit arson, but it is an attempt to commit arson to applying a burning match to a haystack, even if no fire results. The overt act need not be the last act essential to the consummation of the offense. For example, an accused could commit an overt act, and then voluntarily decide not to go through with the in-tended offense. An attempt would nevertheless have been committed, for the combination of a specific intent to commit an offense, plus the commission of an overt act directly tending to accomplish it, constitutes the offense of attempt. Failure to complete the offense, whatever the cause, is not a defense.

(3) Factual impossibility. A person who purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the offense if the attendant circumstances were as that person believed them to be is guilty of an at-tempt. For example, if A, without justification or excuse and with intent to kill B, points a gun at B and pulls the trigger, A is guilty of attempt to murder, even though, unknown to A, the gun is defective and will not fire. Similarly, a person who reaches into the pocket of another with the intent to steal that person’s billfold is guilty of an attempt to commit larceny, even though the pocket is empty.

(4) Voluntary abandonment. It is a defense to an attempt offense that the person voluntarily and completely abandoned the intended crime, solelybecause of the person’s own sense that it was wrong, prior to the completion of the crime. The voluntary abandonment defense is not allowed if the abandonment results, in whole or in part, from other reasons, for example, the person feared detection or apprehension, decided to await a better opportunity for success, was unable to complete the crime, or encountered unanticipated difficulties or unexpected resistance. A person who is entitled to the defense of voluntary abandonment may nonetheless be guilty of a lesser included, completed offense. For example, a person who voluntarily abandoned an attempted armed robbery may nonetheless be guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon.

(5) Solicitation. Soliciting another to commit an offense does not constitute an attempt. See paragraph 6 for a discussion of article 82, solicitation.

(6) Attempts not under Article 80. While most attempts should be charged under Article 80, the following attempts are specifically addressed by some other article, and should be charged accordingly:

(a) Article 85—desertion

(b) Article 94—mutiny or sedition.

(c) Article 100—subordinate compelling

(d) Article 104—aiding the enemy

(e) Article 106a—espionage

(f) Article 128—assault

(7) Regulations. An attempt to commit conduct which would violate a lawful general order or regulation under Article 92 (see paragraph 16) should be charged under Article 80. It is not necessary in such cases to prove that the accused intended to violate the order or regulation, but it must be proved that the accused intended to commit the prohibited conduct.

d . Lesser included offenses. If the accused is charged with an attempt under Article 80, and the offense attempted has a lesser included offense, then the offense of attempting to commit the lesser included offense would ordinarily be a lesser included offense to the charge of attempt. For example, if an accused was charged with attempted larceny, the offense of attempted wrongful appropriation would be a lesser included offense, although it, like the attempted larceny, would be a violation of Article 80.

e. Maximum punishment. Any person subject to the code who is found guilty of an attempt under Article 80 to commit any offense punishable by the code shall be subject to the same maximum punishment authorized for the commission of the offense attempted, except that in no case shall the death penalty be adjudged, nor shall any mandatory minimum punishment provisions apply; and in no case, other than attempted murder, shall confinement exceeding 20 years be adjudged.

U.S. Military

Punitive Articles of the UCMJ
Article 81—Conspiracy

U.S. Military
Punitive Articles of the UCMJ

Article 81—Conspiracy


 “Any person subject to this chapter who conspires with any other person to commit an offense under this chapter shall, if one or more of the conspirators does an act to effect the object of the conspiracy, be punished as a court-martial may direct.”


(1) That the accused entered into an agreement with one or more persons to commit an offense under the code; and

(2) That, while the agreement continued to exist, and while the accused remained a party to the agreement, the accused or at least one of the co-conspirators performed an overt act for the purpose of bringing about the object of the conspiracy.


(1) Co-conspirators. Two or more persons are required in order to have a conspiracy. Knowledge of the identity of co-conspirators and their particular connection with the criminal purpose need not be established. The accused must be subject to the code, but the other co-conspirators need not be. A person may be guilty of conspiracy although incapable of committing the intended offense. For example, a bedridden conspirator may knowingly furnish the car to be used in a robbery. The joining of another conspirator after the conspiracy has been established does not create a new conspiracy or affect the status of the other conspirators. However, the conspirator who joined an existing conspiracy can be convicted of this offense only if, at or after the time of joining the conspiracy, an overt act in furtherance of the object of the agreement is committed.

(2) Agreement. The agreement in a conspiracy need not be in any particular form or manifested in any formal words. It is sufficient if the minds of the parties arrive at a common understanding to accomplish the object of the conspiracy, and this may be shown by the conduct of the parties. The agreement need not state the means by which the conspiracy is to be accomplished or what part each conspirator is to play.

(3) Object of the agreement. The object of the agreement must, at least in part, involve the commission of one or more offenses under the code. An agreement to commit several offenses is ordinarily but a single conspiracy. Some offenses require two or more culpable actors acting in concert. There can be no conspiracy where the agreement exists only between the persons necessary to commit such an offense. Examples include dueling, bigamy, incest, adultery, and bribery.

(4) Overt act.

(a) The overt act must be independent of the agreement to commit the offense; must take place at the time of or after the agreement; must be done by one or more of the conspirators, but not necessarily the accused; and must be done to effectuate the object of the agreement.
(b) The overt act need not be in itself criminal, but it must be a manifestation that the agreement is being executed. Although committing the intended offense may constitute the overt act, it is not essential that the object offense be committed. Any overt act is enough, no matter how preliminary or preparatory in nature, as long as it is a manifestation that the agreement is being executed.

(c) An overt act by one conspirator becomes the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act and each conspirator is equally guilty even though each does not participate in, or have knowledge of, all of the details of the execution of the conspiracy.

(5) Liability for offenses. Each conspirator is liable for all offenses committed pursuant to the conspiracy by any of the co-conspirators while the conspiracy continues and the person remains a party to it.

(6) Withdrawal. A party to the conspiracy who abandons or withdraws from the agreement to commit the offense before the commission of an overt act by any conspirator is not guilty of conspiracy. An effective withdrawal or abandonment must consist of affirmative conduct which is wholly inconsistent with adherence to the unlawful agreement and which shows that the party has severed all connection with the conspiracy. A conspirator who effectively abandons or withdraws from the conspiracy after the performance of an overt act by one of the conspirators remains guilty of conspiracy and of any offenses committed pursuant to the conspiracy up to the time of the abandonment or withdrawal. However, a person who has abandoned or withdrawn from the conspiracy is not liable for offenses committed thereafter by the remaining conspirators. The withdrawal of a conspirator from the conspiracy does not affect the status of the remaining members.

(7) Factual impossibility. It is not a defense that the means adopted by the conspirators to achieve their object, if apparently adapted to that end, were actually not capable of success, or that the conspirators were not physically able to accomplish their intended object.

(8) Conspiracy as a separate offense. A conspiracy to commit an offense is a separate and distinct offense from the offense which is the object of the conspiracy, and both the conspiracy and the consummated offense which was its object may be charged, tried, and punished. The commission of the intended offense may also constitute the overt act which is an element of the conspiracy to commit that offense.

(9) Special conspiracies under Article 134. The United States Code prohibits conspiracies to commit certain specific offenses which do not require an overt act. These conspiracies should be charged under Article 134. Examples include conspiracies to impede or injure any Federal officer in the discharge of duties under 18 U.S.C. §372, conspiracies against civil rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241, and certain drug conspiracies under 21 U.S.C. § 846. See paragraph 60c(4)(c)(ii).

Lesser included offense. Article 80 - Attempts

Maximum punishment. Any person subject to the code who is found guilty of conspiracy shall be subject to the maximum punishment authorized for the offense which is the object of the conspiracy, except that in no case shall the death penalty be imposed.

Impeachment Of President George Walker Bush


Meaning of "High Crimes and Misdemeanors"

by Jon Roland, Constitution Society

The question of impeachment turns on the meaning of the phrase in the Constitution at Art. II Sec. 4, "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors". I have carefully researched the origin of the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" and its meaning to the Framers, and found that the key to understanding it is the word "high". It does not mean "more serious". It refers to those punishable offenses that only apply to high persons, that is, to public officials, those who, because of their official status, are under special obligations that ordinary persons are not under, and which could not be meaningfully applied or justly punished if committed by ordinary persons.

Under the English common law tradition, crimes were defined through a legacy of court proceedings and decisions that punished offenses not because they were prohibited by statutes, but because they offended the sense of justice of the people and the court. Whether an offense could qualify as punishable depended largely on the obligations of the offender, and the obligations of a person holding a high position meant that some actions, or inactions, could be punishable if he did them, even though they would not be if done by an ordinary person.

Offenses of this kind survive today in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It recognizes as punishable offenses such things as refusal to obey orders, abuse of authority, dereliction of duty, moral turpitude, and conduct unbecoming. These would not be offenses if committed by a civilian with no official position, but they are offenses which bear on the subject's fitness for the duties he holds, which he is bound by oath or affirmation to perform.

Perjury is usually defined as "lying under oath". That is not quite right. The original meaning was "violation of one's oath (or affirmation)".

The word "perjury" is usually defined today as "lying under oath about a material matter", but that is not its original or complete meaning, which is "violation of an oath". We can see this by consulting the original Latin from which the term comes. From An Elementary Latin Dictionary, by Charlton T. Lewis (1895), Note that the letter "j" is the letter "i" in Latin.

periurium, i, n,, a false oath, perjury.
periurus, adj., oath-breaking, false to vows, perjured. iuro, avi, atus, are, to swear, take an oath.
iurator, oris, m., a swearer.
iuratus, adj., sworn under oath, bound by an oath.
ius, iuris, that which is binding, right, justice, duty.
per, ... IV. Of means or manner, through, by, by means of, ... under pretense of, by the pretext of, ....

By Art. II Sec. 1 Cl. 8, the president must swear: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." He is bound by this oath in all matters until he leaves office. No additional oath is needed to bind him to tell the truth in anything he says, as telling the truth is pursuant to all matters except perhaps those relating to national security. Any public statement is perjury if it is a lie, and not necessary to deceive an enemy.

When a person takes an oath (or affirmation) before giving testimony, he is assuming the role of an official, that of "witness under oath", for the duration of his testimony. That official position entails a special obligation to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and in that capacity, one is punishable in a way he would not be as an ordinary person not under oath. Therefore, perjury is a high crime.

An official such as the president does not need to take a special oath to become subject to the penalties of perjury. He took an oath, by Art. II Sec. 1 Cl. 8, to "faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States" and to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States" to the best of his ability. While he holds that office, he is always under oath, and lying at any time constitutes perjury if it is not justified for national security.

Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr erred in presenting in his referral only those offenses which could be "laid at the feet" of the president. He functioned like a prosecutor of an offense against criminal statutes that apply to ordinary persons and are provable by the standards of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt". That is not to say that such offenses are not also high crimes or misdemeanors when committed by an official bound by oath. Most such offenses are. But "high crimes and misdemeanors" also includes other offenses, applicable only to a public official, for which the standard is "preponderance of evidence". Holding a particular office of trust is not a right, but a privilege, and removal from such office is not a punishment. Disablement of the right to hold any office in the future would be a punishment, and therefore the standards of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" would apply before that ruling could be imposed by the Senate.

It should be noted, however, that when an offense against a statute is also a "high crime or misdemeanor", it may be, and usually is, referred to by a different name, when considered as such. Thus, an offense like "obstruction of justice" or "subornation of perjury" may become "abuse of authority" when done by an official bound by oath. As such it would be grounds for impeachment and removal from office, but would be punishable by its statutory name once the official is out of office.

An executive official is ultimately responsible for any failures of his subordinates and for their violations of the oath he and they took, which means violations of the Constitution and the rights of persons. It is not necessary to be able to prove that such failures or violations occurred at his instigation or with his knowledge, to be able, in Starr's words, to "lay them at the feet" of the president. It is sufficient to show, on the preponderance of evidence, that the president was aware of misconduct on the part of his subordinates, or should have been, and failed to do all he could to remedy the misconduct, including termination and prosecution of the subordinates and compensation for the victims or their heirs. The president's subordinates include everyone in the executive branch, and their agents and contractors. It is not limited to those over whom he has direct supervision. He is not protected by "plausible deniability". He is legally responsible for everything that everyone in the executive branch is doing.

Therefore, the appropriate subject matter for an impeachment and removal proceeding is the full range of offenses against the Constitution and against the rights of persons committed by subordinate officials and their agents which have not been adequately investigated or remedied. The massacre at Waco, the assault at Ruby Ridge, and many, many other illegal or excessive assaults by federal agents, and the failure of the president to take action against the offenders, is more than enough to justify impeachment and removal from office on grounds of dereliction of duty. To these we could add the many suspicious incidents that indicate covered up crimes by federal agents, including the suspicious deaths of persons suspected of being knowledgeable of wrongdoing by the president or others in the executive branch, or its contractors.

The impeachment and removal process should be a debate on the entire field of proven and suspected misconduct by federal officials and agents under this president, and if judged to have been excessive by reasonable standards, to be grounds for removal, even if direct complicity cannot be shown.


Bush shuns calls for Rumsfeld to resign
By James Harding in Washington
Published: May 6 2004 19:00 | Last Updated: May 7 2004 0:16

President George W. Bush on Thursday came to the aid of Donald Rumsfeld amid growing calls for the secretary of defence to resign over the US military's torture of some Iraqi prisoners.

As the White House struggled to contain the scandal's continuing damage both to the US image abroad and the administration's reputation at home, Mr Bush apologised for the first time, saying he was "sorry for the humiliation suffered".

Mr Bush insisted, however, that Mr Rumsfeld would not be forced from office. "Secretary Rumsfeld has been the secretary during two wars and he is an important part of my cabinet, and he'll stay in my cabinet."

Mr Rumsfeld's future is likely to depend on the testimony he delivers today before Congress, which will expect contrition and transparency from a defence secretary yet to take personal responsibility for the conduct of members of the US military.

The calls for Mr Rumsfeld's resignation have been triggered by the pictures of prisoner brutality, but they are driven by accumulated grievances from across the US political spectrum.

"He has absolutely no political capital with anyone in this town," a former senior Bush administration official said.

Tensions between Mr Rumsfeld's Pentagon and Colin Powell's State department have been a defining feature of the Bush administration. But the president has, until this week, made a point of backing both men.

Mr Rumsfeld has seen off demands for his dismissal before. Criticism has, however, reached a new pitch and Mr Bush took the exceptional step of letting it be known that he scolded Mr Rumsfeld on Wednesday.

White House officials are incensed that the Pentagon had known for at least two weeks that 60 Minutes, the CBS programme, had obtained pictures of prisoners stripped naked and sexually abused by US soldiers but had not warned the president of the impending scandal.

More pictures emerged on Thursday, one showing a female US soldier apparently dragging a naked man on a leash through Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad.

Nancy Pelosi, Democratic leader of the House, was one of many Democrats to demand a resignation. "Mr Rumsfeld should step down . . . [he] has been engaged in a cover-up from the start on this issue."

Members of Congress are furious that they were not informed of the scandal, even though the Pentagon had been aware of the allegations since January.



UPDATE: 12/29/05

Confidential letters from Ambassador Craig Murray...

Letter #1
FM Tashkent
TO FCO, Cabinet Office, DFID, MODUK, OSCE Posts, Security Council Posts
16 September 02
SUBJECT: US/Uzbekistan: Promoting Terrorism

US plays down human rights situation in Uzbekistan. A dangerous policy:
increasing repression combined with poverty will promote Islamic terrorism.
Support to Karimov regime a bankrupt and cynical policy.

The Economist of 7 September states: "Uzbekistan, in particular, has jailed many
thousands of moderate Islamists, an excellent way of converting their families
and friends to extremism." The Economist also spoke of "the growing despotism
of Mr Karimov" and judged that "the past year has seen a further deterioration of
an already grim human rights record". I agree.

Between 7,000 and 10,000 political and religious prisoners are currently detained,
many after trials before kangaroo courts with no representation. Terrible torture
is commonplace: the EU is currently considering a demarche over the terrible
case of two Muslims tortured to death in jail apparently with boiling water. Two
leading dissidents, Elena Urlaeva and Larissa Vdovna, were two weeks ago
committed to a lunatic asylum, where they are being drugged, for demonstrating
on human rights. Opposition political parties remain banned. There is no doubt
that September 11 gave the pretext to crack down still harder on dissent under
the guise of counter-terrorism.

Yet on 8 September the US State Department certified that Uzbekistan was
improving in both human rights and democracy, thus fulfilling a constitutional
requirement and allowing the continuing disbursement of $140 million of US aid
to Uzbekistan this year. Human Rights Watch immediately published a
commendably sober and balanced rebuttal of the State Department claim.
Again we are back in the area of the US accepting sham reform [a reference to
my previous telegram on the economy]. In August media censorship was
abolished, and theoretically there are independent media outlets, but in practice
there is absolutely no criticism of President Karimov or the central government in
any Uzbek media. State Department call this self-censorship: I am not sure that
is a fair way to describe an unwillingness to experience the brutal methods of the
security services.

Similarly, following US pressure when Karimov visited Washington, a human
rights NGO has been permitted to register. This is an advance, but they have little
impact given that no media are prepared to cover any of their activities or carry
any of their statements.

The final improvement State quote is that in one case of murder of a prisoner the
police involved have been prosecuted. That is an improvement, but again related
to the Karimov visit and does not appear to presage a general change of policy.
On the latest cases of torture deaths the Uzbeks have given the OSCE an
incredible explanation, given the nature of the injuries, that the victims died in a
fight between prisoners.

But allowing a single NGO, a token prosecution of police officers and a fake press
freedom cannot possibly outweigh the huge scale of detentions, the torture and
the secret executions. President Karimov has admitted to 100 executions a year
but human rights groups believe there are more. Added to this, all opposition
parties remain banned (the President got a 98% vote) and the Internet is strictly
controlled. All Internet providers must go through a single government server and
access is barred to many sites including all dissident and opposition sites and
much international media (including, ironically, This is in
essence still a totalitarian state: there is far less freedom than still prevails, for
example, in Mugabe's Zimbabwe. A Movement for Democratic Change or any
judicial independence would be impossible here.

Karimov is a dictator who is committed to neither political nor economic reform.
The purpose of his regime is not the development of his country but the diversion
of economic rent to his oligarchic supporters through government controls. As a
senior Uzbek academic told me privately, there is more repression here now than
in Brezhnev's time. The US are trying to prop up Karimov economically and to
justify this support they need to claim that a process of economic and political
reform is underway. That they do so claim is either cynicism or self-delusion.
This policy is doomed to failure. Karimov is driving this resource-rich country
towards economic ruin like an Abacha. And the policy of increasing repression
aimed indiscriminately at pious Muslims, combined with a deepening poverty, is
the most certain way to ensure continuing support for the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan. They have certainly been decimated and disorganised in Afghanistan,
and Karimov's repression may keep the lid on for years – but pressure is building
and could ultimately explode.

I quite understand the interest of the US in strategic airbases and why they back
Karimov, but I believe US policy is misconceived. In the short term it may help
fight terrorism but in the medium term it will promote it, as the Economist points
out. And it can never be right to lower our standards on human rights. There is a
complex situation in Central Asia and it is wrong to look at it only through a prism
picked up on September 12. Worst of all is what appears to be the philosophy
underlying the current US view of Uzbekistan: that September 11 divided the
World into two camps in the "War against Terrorism" and that Karimov is on "our"

If Karimov is on "our" side, then this war cannot be simply between the forces of
good and evil. It must be about more complex things, like securing the long-term
US military presence in Uzbekistan. I silently wept at the 11 September
commemoration here. The right words on New York have all been said. But last
week was also another anniversary – the US-led overthrow of Salvador Allende in
Chile. The subsequent dictatorship killed, dare I say it, rather more people than
died on September 11. Should we not remember then also, and learn from that
too? I fear that we are heading down the same path of US-sponsored dictatorship
here. It is ironic that the beneficiary is perhaps the most unreformed of the
World's old communist leaders.

We need to think much more deeply about Central Asia. It is easy to place
Uzbekistan in the "too difficult" tray and let the US run with it, but I think they
are running in the wrong direction. We should tell them of the dangers we see.
Our policy is theoretically one of engagement, but in practice this has not meant
much. Engagement makes sense, but it must mean grappling with the problems,
not mute collaboration. We need to start actively to state a distinctive position on
democracy and human rights, and press for a realistic view to be taken in the
IMF. We should continue to resist pressures to start a bilateral DFID programme,
unless channelled non-governmentally, and not restore ECGD cover despite the
constant lobbying. We should not invite Karimov to the UK. We should step up
our public diplomacy effort, stressing democratic values, including more resources
from the British Council. We should increase support to human rights activists,
and strive for contact with non-official Islamic groups.
Above all we need to care about the 22 million Uzbek people, suffering from
poverty and lack of freedom. They are not just pawns in the new Great Game.
Letter #2
Fm Tashkent
18 March 2003

1. As seen from Tashkent, US policy is not much focussed on democracy or
freedom. It is about oil, gas and hegemony. In Uzbekistan the US pursues those
ends through supporting a ruthless dictatorship. We must not close our eyes to
uncomfortable truth.

2. Last year the US gave half a billion dollars in aid to Uzbekistan, about a
quarter of it military aid. Bush and Powell repeatedly hail Karimov as a friend and
ally. Yet this regime has at least seven thousand prisoners of conscience; it is a
one party state without freedom of speech, without freedom of media, without
freedom of movement, without freedom of assembly, without freedom of religion.
It practices, systematically, the most hideous tortures on thousands. Most of the
population live in conditions precisely analogous with medieval serfdom.

3. Uzbekistan's geo-strategic position is crucial. It has half the population of the
whole of Central Asia. It alone borders all the other states in a region which is
important to future Western oil and gas supplies. It is the regional military power.
That is why the US is here, and here to stay. Contractors at the US military bases
are extending the design life of the buildings from ten to twenty five years.

4. Democracy and human rights are, despite their protestations to the contrary,
in practice a long way down the US agenda here. Aid this year will be slightly
less, but there is no intention to introduce any meaningful conditionality. Nobody
can believe this level of aid – more than US aid to all of West Africa – is related to
comparative developmental need as opposed to political support for Karimov.
While the US makes token and low-level references to human rights to appease
domestic opinion, they view Karimov's vicious regime as a bastion against
fundamentalism. He – and they – are in fact creating fundamentalism. When the
US gives this much support to a regime that tortures people to death for having a
beard or praying five times a day, is it any surprise that Muslims come to hate
the West?

5. I was stunned to hear that the US had pressured the EU to withdraw a motion
on Human Rights in Uzbekistan which the EU was tabling at the UN Commission
for Human Rights in Geneva. I was most unhappy to find that we are helping the
US in what I can only call this cover-up. I am saddened when the US constantly
quote fake improvements in human rights in Uzbekistan, such as the abolition of
censorship and Internet freedom, which quite simply have not happened (I see
these are quoted in the draft EBRD strategy for Uzbekistan, again I understand at
American urging).

6. From Tashkent it is difficult to agree that we and the US are activated by
shared values. Here we have a brutal US sponsored dictatorship reminiscent of
Central and South American policy under previous US Republican administrations.
I watched George Bush talk today of Iraq and "dismantling the apparatus of
terror… removing the torture chambers and the rape rooms". Yet when it comes
to the Karimov regime, systematic torture and rape appear to be treated as
peccadilloes, not to affect the relationship and to be downplayed in international
fora. Double standards? Yes.

7. I hope that once the present crisis is over we will make plain to the US, at
senior level, our serious concern over their policy in Uzbekistan.

Letter #3
OF 220939 JULY 04

1. We receive intelligence obtained under torture from the Uzbek intelligence
services, via the US. We should stop. It is bad information anyway. Tortured
dupes are forced to sign up to confessions showing what the Uzbek government
wants the US and UK to believe, that they and we are fighting the same war
against terror.

2. I gather a recent London interdepartmental meeting considered the question
and decided to continue to receive the material. This is morally, legally and
practically wrong. It exposes as hypocritical our post Abu Ghraib pronouncements
and fatally undermines our moral standing. It obviates my efforts to get the
Uzbek government to stop torture they are fully aware our intelligence
community laps up the results.

3. We should cease all co-operation with the Uzbek Security Services they are
beyond the pale. We indeed need to establish an SIS presence here, but not as in
a friendly state.

4. In the period December 2002 to March 2003 I raised several times the issue of
intelligence material from the Uzbek security services which was obtained under
torture and passed to us via the CIA. I queried the legality, efficacy and morality
of the practice.

5. I was summoned to the UK for a meeting on 8 March 2003. Michael Wood gave
his legal opinion that it was not illegal to obtain and to use intelligence acquired
by torture. He said the only legal limitation on its use was that it could not be
used in legal proceedings, under Article 15 of the UN Convention on Torture.

6. On behalf of the intelligence services, Matthew Kydd said that they found some
of the material very useful indeed with a direct bearing on the war on terror.
Linda Duffield said that she had been asked to assure me that my qualms of
conscience were respected and understood.

7. Sir Michael Jay's circular of 26 May stated that there was a reporting obligation
on us to report torture by allies (and I have been instructed to refer to Uzbekistan
as such in the context of the war on terror). You, Sir, have made a number of
striking, and I believe heartfelt, condemnations of torture in the last few weeks. I
had in the light of this decided to return to this question and to highlight an
apparent contradiction in our policy. I had intimated as much to the Head of
Eastern Department.

8. I was therefore somewhat surprised to hear that without informing me of the
meeting, or since informing me of the result of the meeting, a meeting was
convened in the FCO at the level of Heads of Department and above, precisely to
consider the question of the receipt of Uzbek intelligence material obtained under
torture. As the office knew, I was in London at the time and perfectly able to
attend the meeting. I still have only gleaned that it happened.

9. I understand that the meeting decided to continue to obtain the Uzbek torture
material. I understand that the principal argument deployed was that the
intelligence material disguises the precise source, ie it does not ordinarily reveal
the name of the individual who is tortured. Indeed this is true – the material is
marked with a euphemism such as "From detainee debriefing." The argument
runs that if the individual is not named, we cannot prove that he was tortured.

10. I will not attempt to hide my utter contempt for such casuistry, nor my
shame that I work in and organisation where colleagues would resort to it to
justify torture. I have dealt with hundreds of individual cases of political or
religious prisoners in Uzbekistan, and I have met with very few where torture, as
defined in the UN convention, was not employed. When my then DHM raised the
question with the CIA head of station 15 months ago, he readily acknowledged
torture was deployed in obtaining intelligence. I do not think there is any doubt
as to the fact.

11. The torture record of the Uzbek security services could hardly be more widely
known. Plainly there are, at the very least, reasonable grounds for believing the
material is obtained under torture. There is helpful guidance at Article 3 of the UN
"The competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations
including, where applicable, the existence in the state concerned of a consistent
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights."
While this article forbids extradition or deportation to Uzbekistan, it is the right
test for the present
question also.

12. On the usefulness of the material obtained, this is irrelevant. Article 2 of the
Convention, to which we are a party, could not be plainer:
"No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked
as a justification of torture."

13. Nonetheless, I repeat that this material is useless – we are selling our souls
for dross. It is in fact positively harmful. It is designed to give the message the
Uzbeks want the West to hear. It exaggerates the role, size, organisation and
activity of the IMU and its links with Al Qaida. The aim is to convince the West
that the Uzbeks are a vital cog against a common foe, that they should keep the
assistance, especially military assistance, coming, and that they should mute the
international criticism on human rights and economic reform.

14. I was taken aback when Matthew Kydd said this stuff was valuable. Sixteen
months ago it was difficult to argue with SIS in the area of intelligence
assessment. But post Butler we know, not only that they can get it wrong on
even the most vital and high profile issues, but that they have a particular yen for
highly coloured material which exaggerates the threat. That is precisely what the
Uzbeks give them. Furthermore MI6 have no operative within a thousand miles of
me and certainly no expertise that can come close to my own in making this

15. At the Khuderbegainov trial I met an old man from Andizhan. Two of his
children had been tortured in front of him until he signed a confession on the
family's links with Bin Laden. Tears were streaming down his face. I have no
doubt they had as much connection with Bin Laden as I do. This is the standard
of the Uzbek intelligence services.

16. I have been considering Michael Wood's legal view, which he kindly gave in
writing. I cannot understand why Michael concentrated only on Article 15 of the
Convention. This certainly bans the use of material obtained under torture as
evidence in proceedings, but it does not state that this is the sole exclusion of the
use of such material.

17. The relevant article seems to me Article 4, which talks of complicity in
torture. Knowingly to receive its results appears to be at least arguable as
complicity. It does not appear that being in a different country to the actual
torture would preclude complicity. I talked this over in a hypothetical sense with
my old friend Prof Francois Hampson, I believe an acknowledged World authority
on the Convention, who said that the complicity argument and the spirit of the
Convention would be likely to be winning points. I should be grateful to hear
Michael's views on this.

18. It seems to me that there are degrees of complicity and guilt, but being at
one or two removes does not make us blameless. There are other factors. Plainly
it was a breach of Article 3 of the Convention for the coalition to deport detainees
back here from Baghram, but it has been done. That seems plainly complicit.

19. This is a difficult and dangerous part of the World. Dire and increasing
poverty and harsh repression are undoubtedly turning young people here towards
radical Islam. The Uzbek government are thus creating this threat, and perceived
US support for Karimov strengthens anti-Western feeling. SIS ought to establish
a presence here, but not as partners of the Uzbek Security Services, whose sheer
brutality puts them beyond the pale.

Press Releases

U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
CONTACT: Emile Milne
(202) 225-4365






Korean War Combat Veteran says withholding information from the President, Congress, and the public, about the abuse of Iraqi prisoners is a “high crime and misdemeanor
WASHINGTON, May 6, 2004 -- Cong. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.), a member of Congress since 1971 and a Korean war combat veteran, today called for the impeachment of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld unless he resigns or President Bush removes him from office.

He announced he was drafting articles of impeachment and made the following remarks on the House floor during the debate on a House resolution concerning the torture of Iraqi prisoners:

“This is a very difficult time for me.  I find it difficult to rise in opposition to this Resolution.  I do it because there just does not seem to be enough outrage involved with what is being said. 

“We should not have to apologize for our brave men and women.  We should not have to apologize for what the Executive Branch or the Congress has or has not done.  We should not be put in this position!

“Several months ago, I called for the resignation of the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, because I thought that, as a major architect of this war, he was fighting this war with other people's children.  And when Rumsfeld said he did not know whether we were winning or losing the war; when he said he did not know if we were creating more terrorists than we were killing; when he said that we had no plan to end the war and that it was a slog - I, as a former combat veteran, thought: Is this the kind leadership that we can expect from the Secretary of Defense?

“America and the Military deserve better than this.  He should resign.  And now the information we receive is that a climate has been created where a handful of people have committed these atrocities against humankind. In an atmosphere where all of the people in Iraq have been demonized; where it appears to Americans and to our military that the people in Iraq are responsible for September 11 and causing us pain; where Secretary Rumsfeld did have information months ago on these atrocities and kept it from the President, kept it from the Congress, and kept it from the American people - I think that this rises to the point that it is a high crime and misdemeanor if he disappointed the President, kept information from the Congress and kept this information from the American people. 

“I think America and the world want us to show the outrage not with rhetoric but with action!  And, if the President does not fire Secretary Rumsfeld, or if he does not resign, I think it is the responsibility of this Congress to file articles of impeachment and force him to out of office.  Then, the whole world will know - not just the military - not just Americans, but the whole world will know what we stand for! 

“If people can say 'mission accomplished' when it looks like there is victory, and then we see atrocities like this and it happens on someone's watch; if they do not have the dignity to say I am sorry and move on - then, we have the responsibility under our Constitution to remove these people from office. 

“He kept the information away from Congress.  We have the responsibility for oversight and to prepare the Articles of Impeachment today.”

Congressman Rangel originally introduced a resolution calling for the resignation of Secretary Rumsfeld on November 7, 2003. 

Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution gives the U.S. House of Representatives “the sole Power of Impeachment.”  Article II, Section 4 allows for the impeachment of “all civil Officers of the United States.”  So far, only one cabinet member has been impeached.  In 1876, Secretary of War William Worth Belknap was impeached for bribery.  Belknap later resigned.

May 6, 2004
Buyer Comments on Iraqi Prisoner Abuse

Rep. Steve Buyer (IN-04)

The abuse of Iraqi prisoners has captured world headlines.Americans want to know if the abuse could have been prevented, and how it was allowed.

An internal report by the U.S. Defense Department determined that Iraqi prisoners were being abused by members of the U.S. military.

Investigators, led by Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, interviewed dozens of witnesses and looked at "numerous photos and videos portraying in graphic detail actual detainee abuse" that were taken by personnel at Abu Ghraib prison on the outskirts of Baghdad.

The report said the abuse included threatening detainees with a pistol and with military dogs, sodomizing a prisoner with a chemical light and perhaps a broomstick, forcing naked prisoners into compromising positions and accusing them of being homosexuals.

Six soldiers have been criminally charged in the case and six others have been reprimanded, with two of those relieved of duty, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has said.

Indiana Congressman Steve Buyer, a former JAG officer in the first Gulf War, and William Bradford, an IUPUI war law expert and former soldier, spoke to News 8 about the abuse, and what it means for the United States.

“It highlights a complete failure of the chain of command within the 800th MP brigade for abuses like this to occur,” said Rep. Buyer (R-Fourth District). “What is important for not only Americans to know, but the world to know, is the United States is signatory to the Geneva Convention. We abide by the convention. We also have laws, rules, procedures and standards and when someone violates them they are prosecuted. What occurred at this prison in Baghdad is not the standard of behavior that is acceptable and justice will be served.”

“It's as bad as it gets to POW's or unlawful combatants who may have been tortured or killed. This is something a good soldier would never do,” said Prof. Bradford.

“The military intelligence companies have an intelligence gathering responsibility and when they turn to the MP's they wanted them to prepare, soften up these prisoners for interrogation. The methods they used are depraved.  That is not the standard to prepare a prisoner for interrogation and what they did was criminal and it was wrong,” said Buyer.

“When you start to get into a low intensity conflict with insurgents you start to develop an enmity that can translate into this sort of abuse through the personalities of some imbalanced or poorly trained people,” said Bradford.

Buyer said he was surprised to learn that lawyers were not present at the joint interrogation facility. He compared the presence of lawyers to having a school principal in a classroom – their role is to make sure the rules are followed.

“I was at the joint interrogation facility. I conducted interrogations myself on war crimes and when the lawyer is present everybody has to abide by the rules and there are no violations. The place where abuse can be open, or there are susceptibilities to abuse, is during the interrogation process.  I concur some JAG officers should have been there on the ground,” said Buyer.

“I have heard allegations that there were directives to use coercive measures to get prisoners to talk. Whether those orders violated the Geneva Convention are uncertain,” said Bradford.

President Bush said today that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld will remain a part of his cabinet, rebuffing calls for Rumsfeld to resign. Bush said Rumsfeld should have told him about the allegations and photos sooner.

“Accountability lies with [Rumsfeld].  It's important the chain of command work so those in the chain of command will look down and say who made what decisions and why.  Everybody needs to be held accountable to it.  Let the facts be permitted to play themselves out,” said Buyer.

Rumsfeld is scheduled to testify Friday morning about the U.S. military abuse of Iraqi prisoners in both open and closed hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee.


Red Cross saw ``widespread abuse'' in Iraq

GENEVA May 7 - Iraqi detainees were subjected to ``serious violations'', with abuse so widespread it may have been condoned by U.S.-led coalition forces, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said on Friday.

Breaking with its usual vow of silence, the Geneva-based humanitarian organisation said visits to coalition detention centres in Iraq, carried out between March and November 2003, had shown infringements of international treaties on the treatment of prisoners of war.

In some cases, the ill-treatment was ``tantamount to torture,'' particularly when interrogators were seeking information or confessions, the ICRC said in a report, parts of which were published in U.S. financial daily the Wall Street Journal.

Pierre Kraehenbuehl, director of ICRC operations, confirmed the contents of the report at a news conference but said the Red Cross, whose reports are confidential, would not issue the rest of the document.

He said the report referred mainly to the actions of U.S. forces at Baghdad's notorious Abu Ghraib prison and elsewhere, although the ICRC had also expressed concerns over the past year to British commanders. He gave no further details.

``Our findings do not allow us to conclude that what we were dealing with at Abu Ghraib were isolated acts of individual members of coalition forces. What we have described is a pattern and a broad system,'' he said.

Pictures of grinning U.S. soldiers abusing naked Iraqis at Abu Ghraib - the largest prison in the country and notorious for torture under Iraqi President Saddam Hussein - have sparked an international outcry.

The excerpts published by the Wall Street Journal spoke of the use of ill-treatment that ``went beyond exceptional cases and might be considered a practice tolerated'' by coalition forces.

That differs sharply from the view of senior officials in the Bush administration that military higher-ups had not condoned abuse, the newspaper said.

In the report, the ICRC said prisoners at Abu Ghraib were held naked in empty cells and beaten by soldiers. Three former military policemen at the prison told Reuters on Thursday that abuse was commonplace.

The humanitarian group also said coalition forces fired on unarmed prisoners from watchtowers and killed some of them, as well as committing ``serious violations'' of the Geneva Conventions governing treatment of war prisoners.

The Red Cross said on Thursday it had repeatedly urged the United States to take ``corrective action'' at the jail.

MEANWHILE, in LONDON, British soldiers punched and kicked Iraqi prisoners and one corporal poked a detainee's eyes until the man screamed, a tabloid newspaper reported Friday.

The Daily Mirror quoted an unidentified British soldier as saying he saw four brutal beatings of prisoners during his deployment in southern Iraq. The man reportedly said British troops regularly placed sandbags over captives' heads and hit their faces, and that officers sanctioned such actions.

``The main thing was holding prisoners' hands up and they'd whack them in the ribs,'' the newspaper quoted the man as saying. ``It would happen on every shift. Whenever guards changed over they'd all do the same. So these guys would just get a continual battering.''

The Ministry of Defense said Thursday that it was questioning the man, whom the Daily Mirror identified only as ``Soldier C.''

The ministry said the man had gone to the Royal Military Police with allegations of mistreatment of prisoners and was being questioned in London. No arrests have been made in connection with his accusations, the ministry said.

British authorities are investigating photos published in the Daily Mirror last week allegedly showing British soldiers threatening and urinating on prisoners in Iraq. The authenticity of those photographs has been questioned, but the newspaper insists they are genuine.

Photos of U.S. troops tormenting and humiliating prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad have caused worldwide revulsion.

Piers Morgan, editor of the Daily Mirror, told British Broadcasting Corp. television that Soldier C would give the military police ``potential evidence.''

``He will also be naming the names of the people responsible, including corporals and sergeants and some senior officers who he says were culpable in tacitly allowing this to happen,'' Morgan said.

The newspaper quoted the soldier as saying his colleagues would put sacks over newly arrived prisoners' heads and then beat them.

``They were so scared, they couldn't see where they were going,'' he said. ``They were trying to fight it as they were dragged around. One guy's trousers fell down to his ankles. Everything was in the open and everyone was laughing at him while he was running around.''

Prisoners were forced to remain in uncomfortable ``stress positions'' for hours on end and some were placed near hot air exhaust pipes during in sweltering weather, he said.

The Guardian newspaper, meanwhile, quoted a former contract employee at Abu Ghraib prison saying that abuses reflected organizational stresses as well as individual misbehavior.

Torin Nelson was quoted as saying that the style of U.S. operations contributed to abuses.

The Guardian newspaper, in a report from Washington, said Nelson formerly served as an interrogator attached to the Utah National Guard at the U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay.

Nelson, who was employed by Titan Corp. and attached to the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade at Abu Ghraib, was among the people interviewed by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba for an internal U.S. Army report about abuses at the prison.

``A unit goes out on a raid and they have a target and the target is not available; they just grab anybody because that was their job,'' Nelson said.

``I've read reports from capturing units where the capturing unit wrote, 'the target was not at home. The neighbour came out to see what was going on and we grabbed him,''' The Guardian quoted Nelson as saying.

Nelson said some of the interrogators used by private contractors weren't well trained.

``I'd say about of the contractors that it's kind of a hit or miss. They're under so much pressure to fill slots quickly ... They penalise contracting companies if they can't fill slots on time and it looks bad on companies' records. If you're in such a hurry to get bodies, you end up with cooks and truck drivers doing intelligence work.'' - AP, Reuters


The Court Martial Of  Lt. William Calley

An Introduction to the My Lai Courts-Martial


The Nuremberg Trials

War Crimes After Nuremberg

(Excerpt) -

The Geneva Convention:

Article 17

No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.

Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War


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